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Abstract 
This work is a collection of three essays about innovation and 
productivity of Italian firms. 
In the first chapter, we show that the historical North-South gap 
of the country has a relationship with firm-level productivity, 
which are more heterogeneous in the South than in the North. We 
find that new and more productive firms systematically self-
select in the NUTS 3-digit locations where more productive firms 
are already present, even after controlling for agglomeration 
economies, and other classical determinants of firm location. 
The second essay analyzes how knowledge spillovers can 
influence firm productivity. As compared to the previous 
literature in which spatial econometric models are used to 
investigate local geographical spillovers, we consider interfirm 
relationships. In particular, we focus our attention on the network 
of interlocking directorates. We find that a spatial model which 
includes interlocking directorates as well as distance performs 
better than traditional models of localized knowledge spillovers. 
We find that interlocking directorates play a crucial role for 
knowledge spillovers in science-based industries. 
The third chapter studies the impact of Italian Law 221/2012 (i.e. 
"Startup Act"), which provides benefits for innovative, small, and 
young companies, in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We 
find that the Startup Act has met its main goals. In particular, we 
find that the positive effects on value-added and productivity 
continue even after the treatment period. 
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General introduction 
 
This thesis is organized into three chapters. The silver line, which 
links my work, is the empirical analysis of innovation and 
productivity of Italian firms in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession. Italy represents an important case study due to the 
critical situation Italian firms faced in recent years. Italy has been 
defined as the "sleeping beauty of Europe" by the international 
press. Indeed, since the mid-nineties the Italian economy has been 
experiencing a persistent lack of growth and low productivity. 
Therefore, Italian firms have been struggling to be competitive in 
the European and global markets. Chronical lack of 
competitiveness and innovation have been amplified by the Great 
Recession. Since 2009, many manufacturing enterprises went out 
of business and there has been a sudden increase in employment, 
especially among the youngest. The policy debate about the 
determinants of the Italian crisis and potential way out is still 
open, as many factors are at play such as the Euro currency, rigid 
labor markets, lack of competition, inefficiencies in the public 
sector and high tax burden, low public and private R&D 
expenditures, political instability, etc. 
The Italian crisis started well before the Great Recession since 
firm productivity has declined sharply in comparison with other 
European countries such as France and Germany.  Moreover, the 
historical economic gap between the prosperous North and the 
undeveloped South has been widening in recent years. The after-
crisis recovery in the North has been faster than in the South, 
where the general employment is largely below the pre-crisis 
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level. For all these reasons, we decided to investigate the current 
situation of Italian firms from multiple points of view. 
The first chapter, co-authored with Armando Rungi, investigates 
firm entry and exit dynamics across different Italian regions at the 
NUTS-3 level. We find that the Northern manufacturing firms are 
generally more productive than the Southern ones, as suggested 
by the common wisdom. Moreover, new companies tend to locate 
in productive areas. At the same time, inefficient firms, which 
decide to enter in high productive provinces, have higher 
probability of exit. Our results confirm theories on endogenous 
sorting of heterogeneous enterprises across multiple potential 
locations. Endogenous sorting contributes to the productivity gap 
between the North and the South of Italy. 
The second chapter studies the spatial effects of productivity 
through a sample of Italian manufacturing companies in science-
based industries. Agglomeration economies are known to be 
important in the Italian case, where similar firms are typically co-
localized in industrial districts. Traditional industrial districts are 
restricted productive areas specialized in a set of related activities 
such as the textile district of Prato (near Florence). It has been 
argued that within industrial districts, tacit knowledge flows 
through formal and informal connections, and specialized 
knowledge is spread across firms. In the second chapter, we 
investigate the role that formal interfirm relationships play in the 
transmission of localized knowledge spillovers. In particular, we 
analyze the effect of interlocking directorates and managerial 
connections on firm productivity. By combining network and 
geographical effects, our analysis highlights the crucial role of 
interfirm networks, which is typically neglected in the recent 
spatial econometric literature on local spillovers. By focusing on 
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knowledge intensive sectors, we find that managerial connections 
are key in the transmission of knowledge spillovers. 
The third chapter (co-authored with Dirk Czarnitzki and 
Massimo Riccaboni) also investigates innovation by Italian firms. 
It analyzes the impact of an Italian startup law entered into force 
in December 2012. This law provides special benefits (as tax 
incentives, special labor law, etc.) for firms registered as 
‘innovative startups'. This special regulation has been 
implemented by the Italian government to increase R&D 
expenditures and investments by small and medium enterprises 
in Italy. Our goal is to assess the impact of the policy on the 
survival and growth of young and small innovative firms. 
Overall, we find that this startup policy has reached its primary 
goals. The treated firms under this act show higher survival rates, 
value-added, and labor productivity than untreated comparable 
firms. These effects persist and are also significant in the post-
treatment period, but more time is needed to assess the long-run 
impact of the policy. However, this policy does not reduce the gap 
between the North and the South: in the Northern regions, the 
treated firms are growing faster than in the Southern ones. 
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I. Sorting of heterogeneous 
firms and the North-South 
divide in Italy 
 
1 Introduction 
Italy is an interesting case to study the demography of firms 
across geography, given the polarized distribution of economic 
activity in the country and the disparities in productivity over 
space and time. Understanding which type of firms emerge in one 
region, why, and how they are selected by local market forces is 
crucial as aggregate productivity eventually depends on the 
ability to allocate resources towards most productive firms 
(Hsieh & Klenow, 2009), and the demography of firms play a 
central role on aggregate dynamics (see Clementi & Palazzo, 
2016). 
In this chapter, we investigate the location choices of new firms 
through a conditional logit model and the exit of inefficient firms 
in the period 2004-2012 in a relationship with the local 
distributions of productivity by incumbent firms at the NUTS 3-
digit level. Recent theory suggests that firms sort endogenously 
into space according to their productivity (Baldwin & Okubo, 
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2006; Behrens et al., 2014; Gaubert, 2017) because firms that are 
more efficient benefit relatively more from local externalities (see 
Combes et al., 2012). Therefore, firms that are more efficient 
eventually locate in larger cities, feeding into existing 
agglomeration economies, and possibly reinforcing the initial 
geographic disparities. 
Indeed, we find that new firms are more likely to emerge in the 
Italian provinces that already host many firms. Moreover, 
productivity of new firms is positively correlated with the 
productivity of incumbents. We also find that a higher probability 
of exiting is associated with a higher productivity at the province 
level. In other words, a higher churning in more productive 
territories points to selection processes driven by local 
competitive forces. Results are robust to control for local 
agglomeration externalities driven by labor markets or 
knowledge spillovers (see Duranton & Puga, 2003). 
Our results depict a strong geographic divide between the North 
and the South of the country in productivity distributions. As 
already documented in official statistics, we find that total factor 
productivity is higher in the North than in the South; however, 
we also find that lower productivity in the so-called 
‘Mezzogiorno’1 is also associated to higher productivity 
dispersions at the province-level. 
Our findings suggest that endogenous sorting plays a crucial role 
in increasing the productivity divide between ‘Mezzogiorno’ and 
the rest of the country. Overall, we find that in the ‘Mezzogiorno’, 
                                                             
1 ‘Mezzogiorno’ traditionally includes the NUTS 2-digit administrative regions of the 
South: Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Molise, Sicily, and Sardinia. 
See also ISTAT (2017). 
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in the period of our analysis: i) there is less than half the 
probability that a new firm starts its activity; ii) new firms are 
about 21% less productive in the first years from incorporation; 
iii) incumbent firms are on average about 30% less productive 
than in the rest of the country; iii) less productive firms are more 
likely to survive in the market. 
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section I.2, we 
briefly introduce the reader to the Italian context. In Section I.3, 
we present data and preliminary evidence on geographic 
disparities. Section I.4 describes our econometric results. Section 
I.5 is the conclusion. 
 
2 The Italian context 
To frame our analyses, we provide a bird's-eye view on the long-
run trends of productivity in Italy, on its long-standing 
geographical divide, and the debate about its determinants. In the 
period 2001-2015, Italy's average real GDP growth was zero due 
primarily to its sluggish total factor productivity (European 
Commission, 2017). According to Calligaris et al. (2016), the 
Italian productivity slowdown has been accounted for by a 
misallocation of resources at the micro-level since its beginning in 
1995, as indicated by an increasingly higher share of less efficient 
firms, which push down the average and up the dispersion in 
productivity distributions.2 Increasing firm-level productivity 
dispersion seems to come from a within-sector component 
                                                             
2 A problem of misallocation of resources is also detected by Linarello & Petrella 
(2016). 
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(Bugamelli et al., 2010) rather than from a specialization pattern 
in sectors with low human capital and technology intensity (Faini 
& Sapir, 2005): heterogeneity in productivity is increasing within 
sectors because firms that are more efficient sit next to less 
efficient firms. Along these lines, Calligaris et al. (2016) find that 
the overall increase in misallocation comes from a higher 
dispersion both within different firm-size classes and 
geographical areas. Moreover, Giacomelli & Menon (2017) find 
that a misallocation of resources is detected also among big firms 
in the North-West of the country, which is traditionally 
considered the "spearhead" of the Italian economy. 
In the aftermath of the most extended economic downturn in 
Italian history, the manufacturing industries emerged with fewer 
firms and fewer employees, at the end of a selection process that 
allowed healthy and more viable firms to gain market shares at 
the expense of more fragile firms (ISTAT, 2017). 
Despite the recent signs of recovery, major geographic differences 
persist between the North and the South of the country, dating 
back to the time when an internal economic integration started, 
after the reunification of the country in 1861. At the time, 
decreasing transportation costs and the elimination of trade 
barriers boosted an agglomeration of manufacturing activity in a 
few provinces, mostly located in the North-West of the country 
(Basile & Ciccarelli, 2017). Economic disparities already present 
before the reunification have been magnified (A'Hearn & 
Venables, 2013) as a consequence of a regional comparative 
advantage of the North of the country based on a relatively higher 
endowment of water as an important source for the production of 
energy (Cafagna, 1989; Bardini, 1997), in a country where coal 
was lacking. 
5 
 
Interestingly, a different strand of research in economic history 
also debates that regions in the South could have undergone a 
process of "passive" rather than "active" modernization (Felice & 
Vasta, 2015), because no dominant political or social actor had 
taken responsibility for a modernization of the country, since 
reunification, based on "inclusive" rather than "exclusive" 
institutions in the sense proposed by Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2012). 
In the name of territorial cohesion, most of the Italian regions in 
the South started to benefit from a Cohesion Policy funded by the 
European Union. Having in mind the possible disparities arising 
from a core-periphery model of development (Quah, 1996; Farole 
et al., 2011), European funds have accrued to Southern regions to 
offset the imbalances coming from geographic remoteness and 
different growth opportunities (Puga, 1999; Overman & Puga, 
2002; Puga, 2002) which are common to other peripheral regions 
within other European countries. 
Having a look at recent trends in economic fundamentals3, Figure 
I.1 shows how in the last decade the gap between ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
and the rest of the country has been widening. Although starting 
from different levels, GDP in the South and in the North had been 
growing at the same pace from 1998 until 2003, when the South 
started to lag behind. Total GDP in the North between 1998 and 
2014 increased by 8.5% versus 1% in the South. Employment has 
been traditionally lower in the South of the country, but Figure 
                                                             
3 At the moment we are writing, 2012 is the latest available year for information 
at the NUTS 3-digit level from official statistics. Therefore, we aggregate NUTS 
3-digit Italian provinces according to the traditional classification in 
‘Mezzogiorno’ and ‘Centro-Nord’ reported also by ISTAT (2017). 
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I.2 shows how a divergence in employment rates started in 2007. 
Indeed, in the post crisis period (2008-2012) the South lost more 
than 5% of jobs, conversely the North in 2012 recovered to almost 
lost position during the crisis.  
 
Figure I.1 Gross Domestic Product 
 
Author’s elaboration on ISTAT (2017). 
Figure I.2 Employment level 
 
Author’s elaboration on ISTAT (2017). 
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A wedge in capital formation between the North and the South is 
observed throughout the period. Figures I.1-3 represent the 
North-South widening gap, base year 1998=100.  
 
Figure I.3 Capital Formation 
 
Author’s elaboration on ISTAT (2017). 
 
3 Data and preliminary evidence 
3.1 A sample of manufacturing firms 
We source firm-level data from ORBIS, a commercial database 
compiled by the Bureau van Dijk that aggregates information 
from several national registries around the globe. Specifically, our 
sample is made of 187,674 Italian companies active in 
manufacturing industries with information on financial accounts, 
geolocation, dates of entry, and exit in the period 2004-2012. 
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In Table I.1, we report a snapshot of the sample geographic 
coverage by Italian regions at the NUTS 2-digit level and compare 
with census data collected by the national statistics office, ISTAT, 
at the end of our period of analysis, in 2012. As expected, 
Lombardia in the North-West of the country is the most 
populated of firms, both in our sample and in population 
statistics, as it is also the most industrialized region of the 
country, collecting almost one-fourth of the total number of firms. 
Five regions in the ‘Centro-Nord’ (Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-
Romagna, Piemonte, and Toscana) account for more than half of 
manufacturing companies in Italy; at the same time, the resident 
population of these five Italian regions is 45% of the total. Just this 
simple evidence denotes a high geographic concentration of 
manufacturing firms in a specific area of the country, in line with 
the historical agglomeration documented in Section 2. 
In Figures I.4 and I.5, we plot the demographics of firms in the 
period 2004 – 2012 as derived from our sample and according to 
census data by ISTAT. We determine the year of entry of new 
firms based on the incorporation date reported in financial 
accounts, which is the year when the firm is registered as a legal 
entity. We assume firms exit based on the information on the 
‘status' and the relative ‘status date', as retrieved from financial 
accounts. Hence, we assume that firms are out of the market when 
they are reported in a status of bankruptcy or liquidation and 
when a firm is finally declassified from national registries.  
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Table I.1 Number of manufacturing firms by region (NUTS-2) in 2012 
Italian region 
Sample Population (ISTAT) 
 Regional 
coverage 
# of firms % # of firms %  % 
Lomardia 44,105 23.0 83,939 19.97  52.54 
Veneto 24,086 12.3 47,411 11.28  50.80 
Toscana 17,289 9.21 40,032 9.52  43.19 
Emilia Rom. 16,774 8.92 39,599 9.42  42.4 
Campania 14,334 7.64 28,072 6.68  51.06 
Piemonte 13,021 6.94 33,289 7.92  39.11 
Lazio 12,892 6.87 22,790 5.42  56.57 
Puglia 8,024 4.28 22,740 5.41  35.29 
Sicilia 6,386 3.40 22,434 5.34  28.47 
Marche 6,383 3.40 17,261 4.11  36.98 
Abruzzo 4,747 2.53 9,653 2.30  49.18 
Friuli-V.G. 4,581 2.44 8,452 2.01  54.2 
Sardegna 2,935 1.56 8,218 1.96  35.71 
Umbria 2,695 1.44 7,023 1.67  38.37 
Liguria 2,634 1.41 8,367 1.99  31.48 
Calabria 2,557 1.36 8,963 2.13  28.53 
Trentino A.A. 2,015 1.07 6,420 1.53  31.39 
Basilicata 1,233 0.66 3,071 0.73  40.15 
Molise 738 0.39 1861 0.44  39.66 
Valle Aosta 245 0.13 725 0.17  33.79 
‘Centro-Nord’ 146,720 77.13 315,308 75.01  46.53 
‘Mezzogiorno’ 40,954 21.82 105,012 24.99  39.00 
Total 187,674 100 420,320 100  44.65 
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Figure I.4 Entry of firms 2004-2012 
 
 
Figure I.5 Exit of firms 2004-2012 
 
 
Sample demographic dynamics do not seem to differ significantly 
when compared to the census. As in the population, we register a 
constant net exit of firms, i.e., the exit rates are always higher than 
the entry rates, because of an ongoing selection process in line 
11 
 
with what reported by ISTAT (2017), which is bringing an 
aggregate increase in productivity since 2014. Unfortunately, we 
cannot track latest periods in our analyses because province-level 
data are not available from ISTAT as of we are writing this text. 
 
3.2 Mapping Total Factor Productivity 
A mapping of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) distributions at the 
NUTS 3-digit level of Italian ‘province’ is reported in Figures I.6 
and I.7, respectively, for the average and the standard deviation 
of manufacturing firms. TFP is estimated mainly following a 
standard Levinsohn & Petrin (2003)4 procedure for the possible 
simultaneity bias deriving from the choice of inputs and the 
unobserved firm-specific productivity processes.5  
In Figure I.6, we observe a clear pattern of decreasing average 
productivities from the North to the South of Italy, which is 
consistent with aggregate official statistics. On average, the most 
productive manufacturing firms can be found in Lombardia, 
                                                             
4 As robustness check we consider also the method introduced by Ackerberg, 
Caves, Frazer (ACF) to compute the TFP. Main results do not change (see the 
Appendix). 
5 For each 2-digit NACE industry, we estimated a Cobb-Douglas firm-level 
revenue-based production function with three inputs: i) labor is proxied by 
number of employees; iii) capital is proxied by fixed assets; iii) intermediates is 
proxied by material costs. Monetary values of firm-level revenues are deflated 
with yearly industry-specific producer price indices, fixed assets are deflated 
with instrumental goods index. Intermediate goods are deflated according an 
input-output table. All these price indices are sourced from EUROSTAT, taking 
as base year 2010.  
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Emilia Romagna, the west of Veneto and Piemonte, and the north 
of Tuscany. 
 
Interestingly, however, when we look at the standard deviations 
of Figure I.7, provinces that are more productive also show, on 
average, less dispersion. In general, in the South and the Center 
of Italy, including the region of the capital, Rome, firms that are 
more productive sit next to largely inefficient firms. 
 
Figure I.6 Average TFP (in logs) by province (NUTS-3) in 2004. 
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Figure I.7 Standard deviations of TFP (in logs) by province (NUTS-3) in 
2004. 
 
 
This evidence is prima facie consistent with the hypothesis of local 
diverse selection processes, which allow only more productive 
firms to survive when competition is fiercer because competitors 
are also more productive. In other words, it is possible that an 
entering firm that wants to start its activity in the north must be 
on average more productive than if it wants to operate in the rest 
of the country. At similar levels of productivity, it is possible that 
a firm is more likely to go bankrupt in the north than in the rest 
of the country. This evidence is consistent with the existence of a 
higher productivity threshold in some more productive areas, 
below which entry is more difficult and exit is easier. 
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In Figure I.8, we also report the distributions of firm-level lnTFP 
collecting provinces in the ‘Centro-Nord’ and in the ‘Mezzogiorno’, 
further differentiating by incumbent firms and new firms that 
entered into activity in our period of analyses. In fact, we observe 
that average productivity is higher in the ‘Centro-Nord’, although 
the heterogeneity in dispersion by provinces is hidden in the 
aggregation by these two macro-regions. In both cases, the 
distribution in productivity of new entering firms is similar and 
almost overlapping with the corresponding distributions by 
incumbent firms. Entering firms are, on average, more productive 
in the North than in the South. 
 
 
Table I.2 The distribution of TFP in 2012, North versus South of Italy  
 lnTFP for ‘Centro-Nord’ lnTFP for ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
5th percentile 3.669 2.777 
10th percentile 3.993 3.197 
25th percentile 4.448 3.732 
50th percentile 4.920 4.249 
75th percentile 5.415 4.791 
90th percentile 5.892 5.323 
95th percentile 6.200 5.652 
average 4.920 4.237 
standard deviation 0.659 0.926 
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Figure I.8 Kernel densities of (log of) TFP: ‘Centro-Nord’ vs ‘Mezzogiorno’, 
entering vs incumbent firms 
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At this stage of the analysis, we cannot exclude that different local 
specialization patterns as well as province-level and firm-level 
characteristics are also potential drivers of the observed 
geographical divide. We will try to separate these effects in the 
following analyses. 
4 Empirical results 
We aim to test the relationship between the entry and exit of firms 
and the characteristics of the NUTS 3-digit Italian provinces with 
a focus on the productivity of incumbent firms. First, we will 
adopt a location model that considers the entry of a new firm as a 
choice made by the entrepreneur conditional on the ex-ante 
characteristics of all Italian provinces. Second, we will consider 
the probability of a firm to exit from a NUTS 3 region (i.e. Italian 
province) also controlling for location-specific factors. Third, we 
will test the premium on the productivity of entering firms after 
the decision of location is made, along our period of analysis. 
4.1 Entering firms 
We adopt a conditional logit model for considering the ex-ante 
characteristics of alternative locations (see McFadden, 1974; 
Maddala, 1982), i.e., the characteristics of all the 103 NUTS 3-digit 
provinces6 where a firm could have entered. That is, we assume 
an underlying discrete choice proxied as a multinomial model, 
according to which firms maximize their profits based on the 
characteristics of the alternative locations. In this way, we have: 
                                                             
6 The number of Italian provinces in 2004. The number has varied in the recent 
years. 
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Equation I.1 
𝚷𝑖𝑗 = 𝝅𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
                 
where firm i can emerge in any alternative province j included in 
the set J made of all 103 Italian provinces, with a systematic 
component 𝝅𝑖𝑗 = 𝒁𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜷, where 𝒁𝑖𝑗, includes the characteristics of 
any location j as evaluated by entering firm i, and coefficients β 
catch their impact on the emergence of new firms.7 We introduce 
fixed effects for new firms, which do not reveal any information 
on their potential productivity when they enter the market. We 
end up with firm-level fixed-effects conditional logit model, in the 
form: 
 
Equation I.2 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
exp (𝒁𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜷)
∑ exp (𝒁𝑖𝑗
′ 𝜷)𝐽𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 are the odds that a firm emerges in a province 
conditional on the distribution of characteristics among all 
provinces.  
                                                             
7 See also Stam (2007) for a similar use of a multinomial model to test the firms' 
locational behavior as the outcome of entrepreneurial initiatives constrained by 
local resources and capabilities. 
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Our main coefficient of interest is the one on province-level 
productivity measured as the average of incumbent firms8, i.e. the 
firms that were already active before the new firm started its 
activity. Among other province-level controls, we include 
population, GDP per capita and endowment of the physical 
infrastructure for transportation, proxied by kilometres of road. 
The variables Mountain, Island and Region Capital are binary 
and indicate respectively whether the province is mainly 
mountainous, it is located on an island, or it also hosts the 
administrative headquarters of the NUTS 2-digit region. An 
indicator of agglomeration is included, which is equal to one 
when the new firm is active in the industry that produces more 
value-added in the province. Market potential is proxied by the 
total sales of incumbent firms in the same industry of the new 
entrants. Competition is proxied by the number of incumbent 
firms in the same industry. Details on the construction of 
variables are included in a Data Appendix. In Table I.3, we report 
different specifications. 
Results show that new firms are more likely to emerge in larger 
provinces. A higher average productivity of incumbent firms is 
associated with more firms entering that province. These results 
are in line with an endogenous sorting of firms at the local level, 
as predicted for example by Baldwin & Okubo (2006) and 
Gaubert (2017). 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 We consider the average firm productivity in 2004 as the average lnTFP 
observed by new entrants.  
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Table I.3 Conditional logit for entering firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
          
            
(log of) Province-level productivity 1.106***  0.885*** 0.599*** 0.519*** 
  (0.210)  (0.249) (0.188) (0.156) 
(log of) Population  0.941*** 0.947*** 1.083*** 0.945*** 
   (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) 
(log of) GDP per capita  0.661*** -0.166 -0.067 -0.138 
   (0.211) (0.129) (0.115) (0.100) 
(log of) Road    -0.092 -0.008 
     (0.112) (0.112) 
(log of) Area    -0.006 -0.023 
     (0.055) (0.065) 
Mountain    -0.374*** -0.280*** 
     (0.109) (0.069) 
Island    -0.445*** -0.463*** 
     (0.119) (0.112) 
Region Capital    -0.333*** -0.323*** 
     (0.064) (0.054) 
Agglomeration     0.663*** 
      (0.253) 
Market Potential     0.025*** 
      (0.005) 
Competition     0.101* 
      (0.061) 
Observations 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0125 0.0795 0.0816 0.0846 0.0918 
Log likelihood -239823 -223538 -223036 -222299 -220573 
Clustered standard errors (NACE 2-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***,0.05**,0.10* 
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Interestingly, when we do not control for province-level 
productivity, a higher GDP per capita in the area correlated with 
a higher probability to start a new business, but a change in the 
sign is observed after that. In fact, we argue that there is an 
implicit correlation9 that we can also find in our data between the 
prosperity of a province and the productivity of its firms. 
However, it is still possible that some areas have higher incomes 
that come from non-productive activities, as in the case of rent-
seeking monopolies and public administration services. We argue 
that the latter could explain the negative sign after the 
introduction of a specific measure of local productivity. As 
expected, mountainous territories and islands attract fewer firms, 
due to the difficulty firms can encounter in logistics and 
transportation, although a specific control for the amount of road 
infrastructure does not show a robust statistical significance. 
Interestingly, region capitals attract less manufacturing firms, 
probably due to a higher cost for industrial real estate. Certainly, 
new firms emerge more likely when there is a higher market for 
that industry. In Appendix Table IV.3, we separate only the firms 
that we can consider as subsidiaries of multinational enterprises.10 
We find that the average province-level productivity is even more 
relevant for the attraction of subsidiaries of multinational 
enterprises. 
In Figure I.9, we report the post-estimation average probabilities 
that a new firm establishes in a province of the ‘Centro-Nord’ and 
                                                             
9 In our dataset correlation is about 0.4 
10 Following international standards (UNCTAD, 2011; OECD, 2015), we 
consider a company to be foreign when its parent company is located in a 
different country. For more details see Del Prete & Rungi (2017) and Rungi et al. 
(2017).   
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in a province of the ‘Mezzogiorno’. That is, after controlling for 
other possible determinants included in Table I.3, we predict 
what is the probability that a new firm establishes in a province. 
After obtaining a probability value for each NUTS-3 region, we 
average over the two macro-regions. We observe that there is 
around a half the probability that a new firm emerges in a 
province of the ‘Mezzogiorno’ (1.3%, vis à vis 2.6%), with no 
significant change over the period of analyses. 
 
Figure I.9 Post-estimation average probability of a new firm in a province of 
‘Centro-Nord’ vs ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
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Equation I.3 
Pr(𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1|𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡) = Φ(𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜷) 
where the dependent variable 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  is binary and equal to one 
when it indicates whether the firm i active in a province j is not 
able to stay in the market at time t. The same controls of the 
previous subsection and Table I.4 are included, this time also 
adding the last productivity the company registered when active, 
and its domestic or foreign status. Industry-level and time-
specific fixed effects are included to consider idiosyncratic 
shocks. Errors are clustered by NUTS-3 region. Nested results are 
reported in Table I.4. 
As expected, less efficient firms are more likely to go out of the 
market. More importantly, the average productivity of the 
province is associated with a higher probability to exit. 
Considering also the results of Section I.4.1, we can conclude that 
more productive areas do present a higher churning of firms and, 
consequently, a fiercer selection process at the local level that is 
largely unaccounted for until now. 
Other geographic indicators, the endowment of road 
infrastructure, agglomeration, and competition do not seem to 
play a significant role. Also, the industry plays a role in the 
probability of exit. The pharmaceutical industry had the lowest 
rate of exit; indeed, pharma is one of the most non-cyclical 
businesses. Conversely, furniture manufacturers showed the 
greatest rate of exit. Furniture companies are linked with the real 
estate market, which downturned after 2008.  
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Table I.4 Probit model for the exit of firms 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exiting firm (Yes/No)             
              
Firm-level productivity -0.374*** -0.377*** -0.373*** -0.376*** -0.374*** -0.376*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Province-level productivity 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.287*** 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 
  (0.050) (0.051) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Foreign ownership     -0.220*** -0.220*** -0.219*** -0.220*** 
      (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 
(log of) Population     -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015 
      (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
(log of) GDP per capita     0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015 
      (0.091) (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) 
(log of) Road     -0.057 -0.056 -0.062 -0.060 
      (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
(log of) Area     0.023 0.022 0.025 0.024 
      (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
Mountain     -0.169 -0.174* -0.168 -0.173* 
      (0.104) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103) 
Island     -0.086 -0.088 -0.085 -0.087 
      (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Region capital     0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 
      (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Agglomeration         0.026 0.028 
          (0.035) (0.035) 
Market potential         -0.001 -0.001 
          (0.002) (0.001) 
Competition         -0.005 -0.004 
          (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -3.366*** -2.846*** -2.760*** -2.250*** -2.849*** -2.337*** 
  (0.289) (0.405) (0.731) (0.826) (0.690) (0.773) 
Observations 510,797 499,660 510,79 499,660 510,797 499,660 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Log likelihood -12721 -12630 -12706 -12615 -12705 -12615 
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.123 0.121 0.124 0.121 0.124 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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On the other hand, we cannot clearly identify a "chain reaction" 
among different industries for the exit analysis, since, 
according to the input-output table, most of manufacturing 
industries have customer-supplier relationships within the same 
industry. 
Finally, we find that firms that are affiliated to multinational 
enterprises are, ceteris paribus, more resilient on the market, 
possibly because they can benefit from a larger pool of resources 
and they are less dependent on the local characteristics of the 
territories. 
 
4.3 Geographic premia on productivity  
In this Section, we eventually assess what the difference in 
productivity is for entering firms and incumbent firms by main 
geographic area of the country and in line with what was 
reported in Figure I.6 and Figure I.8, but this time controlling for 
possibly different industrial compositions, firm-level 
characteristics, and year-specific shocks during the period of 
analyses. 
We test a simple least squares model in the form:   
                        
Equation I.4 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑗 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  
 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm-level 
productivity, Xi indicates firm-level controls (size, capital 
intensity, age) and Zj is either a set of geographic dummies for the 
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five Italian NUTS-1 regions (North-West, North-East, Center, 
South, Insular) or a separation between the ‘Mezzogiorno’ and the 
‘Centro-Nord’. Industry 𝜆𝑘 and time 𝛿𝑡 industry fixed effects 
control for idiosyncratic shocks. Standard errors are clustered by 
NUTS-3 region. 
The results in the first column of Table I.5 show that 
manufacturing firms in ‘Mezzogiorno’ are on-average 30% less 
productive than in ‘Centro-Nord’, even after controlling for 
industrial composition and firm-level heterogeneity in size and 
capital intensity. When we decompose Column 2 by NUTS-1 
region, taking the North-West as the reference base group, we 
observe there is no statistically significant difference between the 
latter and the firms located in the North-East and in the Center of 
the country. Actually, the differences among these macro-regions 
disappear from our estimates after we control for industrial 
composition and firm size. On the other hand, a strong negative 
premium is detected for the firms located in the South and on the 
Islands, which are respectively 31.9% and 33.2% less productive 
than firms in the North-West of the country. 
Finally, in columns 3 and 4 of Table I.5 we separate from our 
sample only the new entering firms and register the first 
productivities they report throughout the period of analyses.11 
We find that new firms already report significantly lower 
productivity in ‘Mezzogiorno’ (-21.4%) in the first years of their 
activity, possibly because of weaker local selection processes, in 
line with previous findings on churning. That is, we argue that 
                                                             
11 Please note how entering firms can show in our sample a variable number of 
observations for productivity, depending on the year they enter. Moreover, 
some of them can also not reporting data in the first years after foundation. 
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less efficient firms are in fact more likely to enter and survive in 
the provinces of the South, where also competitors are on average 
less productive. 
 
 
Table I.5 Least squares for lnTFP by ‘Centro-Nord’ and ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(log of) TFP All firms All firms New entrants New entrants 
          
Mezzogiorno -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 1.481*** 1.587*** 0.536*** 0.596*** 
  (0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.084) 
Observations 510,739 510,739 22,207 22,207 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year dummies No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.688 0.690 0.649 0.653 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table I.6 Least square for lnTFP by Italian macro-regions12 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(log of) TFP All firms All firms New entrants New entrants 
          
North-East -0.020 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) 
Center -0.042 -0.042 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023) 
South -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.228*** -0.226*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) 
Islands -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.210*** -0.208*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033) 
Constant 1.504*** 1.609*** 0.547*** 0.607*** 
  (0.061) (0.062) (0.051) (0.087) 
Observations 510,739 510,739 22,207 22,207 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year  No Yes No Yes 
 R-squared 0.688 0.690 0.649 0.653 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
  
However, the negative premium for entering firms is significantly 
less than the one for all firms, probably because other intervening 
factors that determine a wedge between the North and the South 
of the country have yet to display an impact on younger firms. 
                                                             
12 ‘Centro-Nord’ is composed by North-West, North-East and Center. 
‘Mezzogiorno’ is composed by Islands and South. 
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We can imagine that institutional factors can show up later 
during the life cycle of the firm, rather than at the beginning of 
their activity. For example, regarding the importance of the 
efficiency of institutions, Giacomelli & Menon (2017) find that 
reducing the length of civil procedure increases firm size in the 
area. In Figure I.8, we report the post-estimates premia on 
productivity by year after incorporation. We find no specific 
trend over time, although we can observe a maximum of only five 
years after a firm becomes operative. 
    
Figure I.10 lnTFP after entry, post-estimation geographic premia. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we tested the entry and exit of Italian 
manufacturing firms in a relationship with characteristics of 
Italian provinces, in the NUTS-3 region, with a focus on the 
productivity distributions of incumbent firms. In line with recent 
theories, we detect a sorting of heterogeneous firms by 
geography. A higher churning of firms is associated with more 
productivity in the NUTS-3 region (i.e., Italian provinces). After 
entry, firms show a higher productivity premium where already 
more productive firms are. Our findings point to the presence of 
diverse local selection processes that contribute to shaping 
geographic disparities. Moreover, we do not think that our results 
can be affected by excessive heterogeneity due to LevPet 
estimation, because the ratio between the 95th-percentile and the 
5th-percentile is around 2 -- not as large as the Chilean case of 
20.90 as found in Gandhi et al. (2016). Our results are also 
confirmed by robustness checks with a lnTFP computed by ACF 
methodology (see appendix 1.1: Tables IV.5 – IV.8). In the specific 
Italian case, we argue that our findings point to a potential 
persistence of the historical geographic divide in the country, 
between a more developed North and a less developed South. 
Policies that do not consider such microeconomic dynamics from 
firm-level heterogeneity could fail in tackling regional disparities 
in Italy or elsewhere. 
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II. Productivity Spillovers 
and Interlocking 
Directorates in High-Tech 
Sectors 
 
1 Introduction 
Many determinants of business productivity have been identified 
in recent decades, for example, technological change and 
innovation (Van Biesebroeck, 2003; Sakellaris & Wilson, 2004), 
managerial skills (Ichniowski et al., 1997; Lazear, 2000; Hamilton 
et al., 2003), quality of human capital (Moretti, 2004; Ilmakunnas 
et al., 2004; Galindo-Ruenda & Haskel, 2005), learning-by-doing 
(Thornton & Thompson, 2001), product innovation (Acemoglu & 
Linn, 2004; Klette & Kortum, 2004; Bartel et al., 2007; Lentz & 
Mortensen, 2008), competition (Nicoletti & Scarpetta, 2005; 
Schmitz, 2005; Foster et al., 2006), flexible input markets 
(Maksimovic & Philips, 2001; Bartelsman et al., 2009; Petrin & 
Sivadasan 2013), and spillovers (Griffith et al., 2006b; Crespi et al., 
2008; Keller & Yeaple, 2009; Syverson, 2011). 
Among these factors, knowledge plays a key role, in particular, 
knowledge spillovers, defined as the sharing of know-how, ideas, 
and information, especially in high-tech sectors. Typically, 
individuals share information when they live or work in the same 
31 
 
area, referring, in this case, to knowledge spillovers through 
geographical proximity (i.e., geographical spillovers). Knowledge 
spillovers can be further classified. Based on the work by 
Stoyanov & Zubanov (2012), knowledge spillovers can be divided 
into “codified” and “uncodified” knowledge spillovers. Patent 
citations represent a classic example of "codified" knowledge 
spillover (Griliches, 1992; Jaffe et al., 1993; Hall et al., 2001; 
Maurseth & Verspagen, 2002). "Uncodified" knowledge 
spillovers are typically investigated through concepts such as 
workers' mobility (Rao & Drazin, 2002; Song et al., 2003; Moretti, 
2004; Gorg & Strobl, 2005; Balsvik, 2011; Poole, 2013). 
Research on knowledge spillovers and agglomeration economies 
dates back to Alfred Marshall's “Principles of Economics”, first 
published in 1890. This topic has been popularized in the last few 
decades thanks to, among others, Jacobs (1969), Becattini (1979), 
Porter (1990), Glaeser et al. (1992), van der Panne (2004), Bellandi 
& Di Tommaso (2005), and Raffaelli et al. (2006). More recently, 
there has been a methodological upgrade in the literature by 
using spatial econometrics. Notable examples of this new trend 
are Cardamone (2014), Antonelli et al. (2010), Badinger & Egger 
(2016), Bottazzi et al. (2003), and Sangalli & Lamieri (2015). 
Scholars usually found that geographical spillovers do exist. 
A significant way in which a director can influence a firm's 
productivity is through the crucial role of managerial practices, 
as demonstrated by a study based on large-scale survey data 
(Bloom et al., 2007). Due to the lack of data on directors' networks, 
there are only a handful of studies on the relationship between 
interlocking directorates and firm performance in Italy such as 
Croci & Grassi, 2014; (other recent works on Italian interlocking 
directorates composition are: Bellenzier & Grassi, 2014; Drago et 
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al., 2011; Fattobene et al., 2017). Other contributions on different 
countries include: Yeo et al. (2003) for France, Rommens et al. 
(2007) for Belgium, Prinz (2006) for Germany, and Buchwald 
(2014) for European companies. Most of the work so far has 
considered only companies listed on the stock exchange due to a 
lack of data. 
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the role of interlocking 
directorates as conduits of knowledge spillovers. In our analysis, 
we focus on knowledge intensive firms in Italy. As indicated by 
Van Biesebroeck (2003) and Sakellaris & Wilson (2004), 
technology changes and innovation are crucial for firm 
productivity and success. We assert that interlocking directorates 
can generate positive spillovers through innovation, especially in 
science-based industries. We use patent intensity13 as an indicator 
of innovation in science-based sectors. Indeed, the most 
innovative sectors based on patent intensity are: pharmaceuticals, 
chemistry and electronics (they are the only ones with a patent 
intensity greater than 500, see Table II.1). These industries 
correspond to science-based sectors in the Pavitt’s taxonomy 
(Pavitt, 1984). This is not surprising since innovation and 
intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals, chemistry and 
electronics are fundamental for firms’ survival, growth and 
competitiveness.  
  
                                                             
13 As measured by the number of EPO patents per 100,000 employees. 
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Table II.1 EUIPO survey on patent intensity by NACE rev. 2 
NACE rev. 2 (2 digits) description Patent Intensity* 
C10 Manufacture of food product 20.25 
C11 Manufacture of beverages 7.97 
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 71.86 
C13 Manufacture of textiles 43.34 
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 7.93 
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products 23.30 
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
13.76 
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 69.83 
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 19.01 
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 32.19 
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  506.77 
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
599.32 
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 213.20 
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 56.35 
C24 Manufacture of basic metals 80.15 
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
105.69 
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 890.65 
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 361.97 
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment not else where classified 477.72 
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 317.53 
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 395.01 
C31 Manufacture of furniture 25.75 
C32 Other manufacturing 232.28 
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
 
45.04  
* Patent intensity computed as EPO applications over 100,000 employees. Underlined values over 500. Sourced 
European Union Intellectual Property Office 
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Conversely, as shown by the EUIPO survey reported in Table II.1, 
in the most traditional industries such as food, beverages, 
wearing apparel, and furniture, patent intensity is much lower. 
The interlocking directorates play an important role in high-tech 
industries to share know-how and tacit knowledge. We find that 
the interlocking directorates' connections among science-based 
firms are 4.8 times denser than the average of all manufacturing 
sectors. Moreover, the majority (53%) of managerial connections 
by science-based firms are with other firms in the same sector. 
For all these reasons, we choose to focus our analysis on the high-
tech sectors or, more precisely, on the science-based industries 
according to Pavitt's taxonomy. 
In this work, we combine two different streams of research on 
firm productivity. The first stream of literature is about spillovers 
and agglomeration effects through shared innovation knowledge 
in a particular geographical area (see, for instance, Cardamone, 
2014). The second stream of research has focused on the role of 
interlocking directorates (i.e., whether members of the board of 
directors are simultaneously on the board of another firm; see, for 
example, Croci & Grassi, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, 
agglomeration effects and interlocking directorates have not been 
jointly investigated, mainly due to the lack of data for directors 
and the locations of firm activities. First, we apply a simple spatial 
model to examine the presence of knowledge spillovers through 
interlocking directorates. Then, we focus on models that control 
for firms' geographical proximity to determine if the effect of 
interlocking directorates on knowledge spillovers still holds. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section II.2 introduces our 
dataset. In Section II.3, we describe the spatial econometrics 
methodology. Section II.4 presents and describes the results of 
our research. Finally, Section II.5 concludes by discussing our 
findings. 
 
2 Data 
Our data are taken from AIDA, which is a commercial database 
managed by Bureau van Dijk Company. This database comprises 
data from Italian firms. We obtained observations for the year 
2014 since data on interlocking directorates is a new feature in 
AIDA, introduced for 2014. We selected firms in the science-based 
industries (i.e., sectors 20, 21 and 26 in the NACE rev.2 
classification). We collected data on total revenue, cost of 
materials, value of tangible assets, value of intangible assets, 
number of employees, value of patents, know-how, trademarks 
and other intellectual property rights, final owner nationality, 
geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude), and list of 
administration board members. 
According to AIDA, there were approximately 7,000 science-
based manufacturing firms in Italy in 2014. One-half of these 
firms reported data on revenues, tangible assets, cost of materials, 
and number of employees. Since intellectual property rights are 
also missing14, we are left with 1,500 firms with complete 
                                                             
14 Some studies use data on export and innovation from Unicredit Surveys. 
These surveys collect data about 150/200 Science Based manufacturing 
enterprises. We hope in the future to have more firms, which report data on 
innovation activities. 
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information. Additionally, some companies do not report 
information on the Board of Administration. Therefore, only 801 
firms can be considered in our analysis. Our final sample includes 
firms that are quite heterogeneous in size whereas previous 
studies, such as Croci & Grassi (2014), have analyzed a smaller 
sample of companies listed on the Milan stock exchange 
(approximately 200 companies). 
Table II.2 shows that small firms with less than 50 employees 
make up almost half of all the firms in our sample, whereas large 
firms with more than 250 employees are about 10% of our sample. 
The composition of our sample is in line with the Italian firm size 
distribution, where most companies belong to the SME (small-
medium enterprise) category. Thus, our sample is more 
representative of the population of firms in Italy than the listed 
companies (on the stock market, large firms are overrepresented). 
About 24% of firms in the sample are subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational companies. As is well-known, multinational 
companies are overrepresented among science-based firms in 
Italy (MNCs are about 5% of all manufacturing companies in 
Italy). 
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Table II.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Abbr. min median mean  max sd 
Natural logarithm of 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
lnTFP 8.859 11.279 11.271  12.890 0.547 
Value in thousands 
of Euros of 
innovation per 
worker 
Innovation 0 0.310 0.720  5.928 1.024 
Firms with less than 
50 employees 
Small 0 0 0.422  1 0.494 
Firms with 
employees between 
50 and 250 
Medium 0 0 0.472  1 0.500 
Firms with more 
than 250 employees 
Large 0 0 0.106  1 0.308 
Firms who have an 
Italian control owner 
Domestic 0 1 0.757  1 0.429 
Firms who have a not 
Italian control owner 
International 0 0 0.243  1 0.429 
        
 
Table II.3 Key feature of high-tech firms with managerial connections 
 Number 
of 
connected 
firms 
% of 
connected 
firms 
Number 
of non-
connected 
firms 
% of non-
connected 
firm 
% of 
AIDA 
data 
% of 
the 
sample 
Small 40 11.83% 298 88.17% 86.96% 42.19% 
Medium 61 16.14% 317 83.86% 10.20% 47.19% 
Large 32 37.65% 53 62.35% 2.83% 10.61% 
International 36 18.46% 159 81.54% 4.98% 24.24% 
Domestic 97 16.01% 509 83.99% 95.12% 75.66% 
All 133 16.60% 668 83.40% 100 % 100 % 
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Figure II.1 Probability distribution 
 
 
Focusing on the interlocking directorates, we built a network 
made of 801 firms (i.e., nodes) and 109 connections through 
mutual directories (i.e., edges), where the maximum number of 
connections for a company is four. Table II.3 shows that large 
companies are more connected (37.65% of the total) than SMEs. 
On the other hand, we cannot observe a very different ratio in 
connectivity between domestic and international firms. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure II.1, the probability to have an 
interlocking directorates' connection is higher for firms at a short 
distance, in a range below 20 kilometers. The average 
geographical distance between two connected firms is 131 km, 
which is well below the average distance between all firms in 
AIDA (228 km). These findings suggest that interlocking 
directorates may be influenced by the geographical distribution 
of firms, i.e, nearby firms are more likely to be connected. 
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3 Methodology 
In our analysis firm productivity represents our dependent 
variable. Following a large body of literature on spillovers for 
manufacturing industries, we use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
as a measure of firm productivity. To compute TFP we use the 
same methodology as in Cardamone (2014)15 to consider a log-
linear Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies 
constant returns to scale: 
Equation II.1 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
𝛼 ∙ 𝐿𝑖
1−𝛼 
 
where Yi is the value-added of firm i in 2014, Ki is the amount of 
tangible assets of firm i in 2014, and Li is the number of employees 
of firm i in 201416. 
After a logarithmic transformation, we get 
Equation II.2 
ln (
𝑌𝑖
𝐿𝑖
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ ln (
𝐾𝑖
𝐿𝑖
) + 𝜀𝑖 
In this way, we can estimate the parameter α1 by a standard least 
squares regression. Later, we can calculate the natural logarithm 
of TFP for firm i as follows 
 
                                                             
15 In robustness checks, we consider also LevPet and ACF. 
16 As written above, only data for 2014 are available for our analysis; thus, we 
cannot use techniques that need a panel dataset. 
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Equation II.3 
ln(𝑇𝐹?̂?𝑖) = ln 𝑌𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼1̂) ∙ ln 𝐿𝑖 − 𝛼1̂ ∙ ln 𝐾𝑖 
 
Thus, for each firm, we obtain a specific value of ln TFP. The next 
step consists in studying which variables could affect TFP at the 
firm level. 
To estimate possible spillover effects on firm TFP, we employ 
spatial econometrics with parametric linear models (Anselin, 
1988). In the literature, different spatial econometric models are 
available (LeSage & Pace, 2009 and Elhorst, 2014). Each model 
could be considered for a specific issue, such as for example 
Spatial Error Model for missing variables or Spatial 
AutoRegressive model for spatial spillovers. Partially following 
the structure employed in Sangalli & Lamieri (2014) for the Italian 
case, we believe that the most useful models in our analysis are 
the Spatial Autoregressive model (usually abbreviated as SAR) 
and the combined SAC model. In both models, spillover effects 
are considered: the firm productivity (our dependent value) 
depends on the productivity of the other firms.  
As explained in Elhorst (2014), a SAR model17 can be written as 
 
Equation II.4 
𝒚 = 𝜌𝑾𝒚 + 𝑿𝜷+ 𝜺 
 
                                                             
17 We use R software. The parameters of the different spatial models are 
estimated through maximum likelihood. 
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where y (n x 1) is the dependent variable (in our case ln TFP), and 
X (n x k) is the matrix of independent variables. Obviously, β (k x 
1) are the associated coefficients, and ε (n x 1) the error term. 
Finally, W (n x n) is the spatial weight matrix, and ρ is the spatial 
coefficient. The main novelty of the SAR model consists in a 
dependent variable expressed as a function of the dependent 
variables of other individuals. 
Transposing this model to our case means that TFP of a firm in a 
science-based industry is also influenced by other firms' TFP 
values and not only its own level of innovation. 
Since our research question is about the existence of spillovers 
(i.e. indirect effects), we are intersted how to calculate them in 
SAR model. For the SAR model, it is relevant to clarify that direct 
and indirect impacts (i.e., spillovers) need to be calculated. 
Indeed, we cannot consider just 𝛽𝑘 and ρ as indicators. Following 
the reasoning in LeSage & Pace (2009), the SAR model can be 
written as 
 
Equation II.5 
(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀  
 
Equation II.6 
𝑦 =∑𝑆𝑟(𝑊)𝑥𝑟 + (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗)
−1𝜀
𝑘
𝑟=1
 
where: 𝑆𝑟(𝑊) = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗)
−1𝐼𝑛𝛽𝑟 
Thus, its derivative is given by 
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Equation II.7 
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝑘
= (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑗)
−1𝛽𝑘 
This can be rewritten, with a lighter notation, as 
 
Equation II.8 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝛽𝑘 
 
One can conclude that the diagonal elements of the equation 
above give the direct impacts and the off-diagonal elements 
represent the indirect impacts. We must highlight that the 
coefficients βk, ρ and their p-values cannot provide information 
on the existence of positive or negative impacts. However, one 
necessarily needs to compute separately impacts and their p-
values. Thus, we conclude that spillovers exist if and only if 
indirect impacts are statistically significant. 
Finally, to complete the analysis, we also introduce a second 
model called SAC, which is a generalization of SAR. Loosely 
speaking, a SAC model as a different error term (Kelejian & 
Prucha, 2010). In more detail, the model is expressed as follows 
 
Equation II.9 
𝒚 = 𝜌𝑾𝟏𝒚 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝜺 
𝜺 = 𝜆𝑾𝟐𝜺 + 𝒖  
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where y (n x 1) is the dependent variable (in our case ln TFP), and 
X (n x k) is the matrix of independent variables. Obviously, β (k x 
1) are the associated coefficients, and ε (n x 1) the error term. 
Finally, W1 (n x n) is the first spatial weight matrix linked with the 
other dependent variables of other individuals, and ρ is the 
spatial coefficient. Moreover, in an SAC model we have also W2 
(n x n), which is the second weight matrix linked with error term, 
whereas u (n x 1) is the innovation part. For more information see 
Kelejian & Prucha (2010) and LeSage & Pace (2009).  
In the SAC model, the two contiguity matrices may be generated 
by two different rules or phenomena (for example, one based on 
the geographical distance, and the other one based on social 
connections). Hence, one gets that W1 ≠ W2. Conversely, one can 
also assume that the two weight contiguity matrices are created 
by the same rule, in which case W1 =W2. 
To select the most suitable exogenous matrix W and model (inside 
a set of “reasonable” such matrices), we use the Akaike 
Information Criterion18 (AIC). AIC, as suggested by its name, is a 
criterion that can indicate which model fits better among a given 
set of models. From a practical point of view, the AIC chooses the 
model with the lowest associated value. The main reason for 
using the AIC consists in its capacity to compare different models, 
which are not necessarily nested. 
 
                                                             
18 The AIC value has the following formula: 2𝑘 − 2 ln(𝐿), where k is the number 
of parameters and L the value of the likelihood function. Other popular criteria 
are represented by the level of likelihood and Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC).  BIC takes into account also the number of observations. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Preliminary evidence 
First, in this section we present results from a simple Least Square 
regression. Here, following a similar framework to Cardamone 
(2014), we specify the productivity levels as follow 
Equation II.10 
 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
On the productivity side, we confirm the main findings in the 
literature: innovative firms show higher level of productivity. Not 
surprisingly, international manufacturers are on average more 
productive than Italian firms, because a process of self-selection 
exists where only efficient and productive firms can enter foreign 
markets. 
Table II.4 Preliminary results from LS model 
variable lnTFP 
Innovation 7.154*** 
(1.843) 
International 0.236*** 
(0.044) 
Constant 11.163*** 
(0.025) 
R2 0.051 
Adjusted R2 0.049 
Observations 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
45 
 
As already conjectured, we find from the results of the LS 
regression that innovation has a positive effect on lnTFP, since the 
coefficient associated with innovation is positive and strongly 
significant at the 1% level, as in Cardamone (2014). Therefore, 
firms' productivity clearly positively depends on innovation. This 
result is still debated in the literature. For instance, Griffith et al. 
(2006a) study innovation effects on labor productivity, but results 
in their analysis vary across the four analyzed European countries 
(i.e., France, Germany, Spain and the UK). 
In this preliminary regression, since we consider a simple LS, we 
do not have any clue about the existence of knowledge spillovers. 
In the next sections we focus on this important research question. 
 
4.2 The role of interlocking directorates 
So far, we have not considered in our regression model possible 
spillovers among firms. As we have already written above, a large 
body of the literature focuses on spillovers generated by 
neighboring firms. In this work we would like to show the 
existence of spillovers generated by interlocking directorates. For 
this reason, we must introduce a weight contiguity matrix W to 
adopt a SAR model and investigate possible indirect impacts of 
innovation and international ownership. In our interlocking 
directorates’ contiguity matrix, entries have value one when the 
two firms have at least one mutual director and a value close to 
zero otherwise19: 
                                                             
19 The motivation for inserting a very low value (but not zero) for firms, which 
do not have at least a director in common, resides in not dropping any 
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Equation II.11 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 =
{
 
 
1 𝑖𝑓𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
1
(𝑛 − 1)2
 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
We consider now a SAR model, which has the same independent 
variables of LS regression above and the W matrix defined 
according to the interlocking directorates’ network. 
 
Table II.5 Regressions results for geographical SAR 
 lnTFP 
Innovation 6.316*** 
(1.804) 
International 0.228*** 
(0.043) 
Intercept 7.865*** 
(0.672) 
Rho 
 
0.292*** 
(0.060) 
Loglikelihood 
 AIC 
-620.512 
1251.025 
 Observations 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**,0.10* 
 
                                                             
observation in our sample. Otherwise, we would have incurred the risk of 
having a biased sample. 
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As before, the coefficients associated with Innovation and 
International are positive and significant. We also find that rho 
(i.e. spatial autoregressive coefficient) is positive and significant. 
After running regressions and computing impact analysis of the 
chosen model, we do find that interlocking directorates’ 
spillovers do exist. 
 
Table II.6 SAR model with the chosen geographical matrix 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 6.396*** 
(1.826) 
2.592** 
(1.069) 
8.989*** 
(2.683) 
International 0.2314*** 
(0.044) 
0.094*** 
(0.032) 
0.325*** 
(0.066) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 
0.05**, 0.10* 
In Table II.6, we observe positive direct effects for innovation and 
International ownership. Both coefficients associated with these 
two variables are positive and significant at the 0.01 p-value level. 
Thus, we find positive direct effects. Focusing on our core 
research question, i.e. the existence of indirect effects (spillovers), 
we find a positive coefficient associated with innovation. Given 
that this time the associated p-value is 0.012, we conclude that 
spillovers based on interlocking directorates are also positive. 
Therefore, we find empirical evidence in favor of spillovers that 
positively affect firm productivity. Here, in the SAR model 
spillovers account for around 29% of the total effects. We also 
reach similar conclusions for the effect of spillovers by 
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multinational companies: international firms produce positive 
externalities on lnTFP as in Lu et al. (2017). 
 
4.3 Geographical spillovers 
We pass now to compare the effect of interlocking directorates to 
geographical spillovers.  
Different models have been used in the literature to estimate 
geographical spillovers. For example, some scholars estimate 
geographical distance through ZIP codes, information on 
municipalities, or they consider two firms as neighbors if they are 
in the same or an adjacent region. Due to the availability of 
geographical coordinates (i.e., longitude and latitude) for all firms 
in our sample, we decide to estimate distance for each firm pair 
through a standard Haversine formula20.  
Since different contiguity matrices can be defined for the 
geographical distance, in our analysis we considered the most 
frequently used in the literature. 
                                                             
20 The Haversine formula is employed in case one needs to compute the distance 
between two points on the surface of a sphere or globe. The Haversine formula 
is defined as follow (Aldieri & Cicera, 2009) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 2 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ ∙ √sin2 (
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗−𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
2
) + cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) ∙ cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) ∙ sin2 (
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖
2
), where 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡ℎ = 6371.0 𝐾𝑚 
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We start by considering a “simple geographical” contiguity 
matrix version without any cut-off21. In this case, entries are given 
by the following expression22: 
Equation II.12 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 = {
min(1,
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
)  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 
 
In this case, we assume that possible spillover effects among 
enterprises decrease linearly with their geographical distance. 
Moreover, we consider also more sophisticated geographical 
contiguity matrices, which are based on the squared distance23, 
namely 
Equation II.13 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 = {
min(1,
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
2 )  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 
 
 
Here, possible spillover effects diminish more than 
proportionally with distance. 
                                                             
21 We abbreviate this matrix lin as linear distance: Moreover, mij is not yet a 
standardized matrix, the associated standardized matrix is indicated as Wij 
22 We set a minimum distance of 1 Km to avoid any problem with a distance 
close to zero. Other solutions may be implemented, for example see Cardamone 
(2014). 
23 We abbreviate this matrix as squ as squared distance. 
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Finally, we try to introduce some cut-offs – namely, 20 Km, 50 
Km, and 80 Km24 - in the linear and square geographical 
distance25. In in the case of cut-offs, firms that are farther than the 
given cut-offs will have an almost zero effect.  
Analytically, the linear case reads as26 
 
Equation II.14 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 min (1,
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
)  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 
1
1250
 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Similarly, the square case reads as 
 
Equation II.15 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 min (1,
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
2 )  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 
1
12502
 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
                                                             
24 These three thresholds are chosen between the 10th percentile (i.e. 20.74 Km) 
and the 26th percentile (i.e. 80.09 Km) of the geographical distance distribution.  
25 We abbreviate the linear distance matrices, respectively as: lin20, lin50, and 
lin80. The squared distance matrix as squ20, squ50, squ80. 
26 We insert a notional distance of 1250 Km to avoid a smaller biased subsample. 
51 
 
Among the proposed geographical matrix, we choose the best 
one27 following Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
 
Table II.7 AIC values for SAR models using different geo distance matrices 
 20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-
off 
Linear 
distance 
1268.663 1267.169 1265.339 1266.908 
Squared 
distance 
1270.694 1270.397 1269.111 1268.988 
The lowest value is underlined 
 
According to Table II.7, the geographical model that fits better our 
data is the one, which considers as contiguity matrix a linear 
distance with a cut-off of 80 Km. Anyway, this geographical 
model has a higher AIC value than the previous interlocking 
directorates’ model (its AIC value was 1251.025). Thus, we must 
underline that spillovers through interlocking directorates 
performs better any knowledge location spillover model. 
 
4.4 Interlocking directorates and geographical 
spillovers 
As was already hinted in the data section, we observe that 
connected firms have, on average, a shorter geographical distance 
than unconnected ones. For this reason, we assert that a negative 
                                                             
27 As already hinted above, there is not any “rule” a priori to decide which is the 
best contiguity matrix to be used. 
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relationship between geographical distance and interlocking 
directorates exists, as found by Kono et al. (1998), where closer 
firms have higher chances to be connected through interlocking 
directorates. 
To further investigate this relationship, we employ a logit model 
to check whether the probability of having an interlocking 
directorates connection negatively depends on distance. Our logit 
regression has 320,400 unique pairs of observations, since our 
model is made of 801 firms28. For the dependent variable, we use 
a dummy variable, which is one if the selected pair shares at least 
one director, zero otherwise.  For each pair, we compute as 
independent variable the geographical distance in kilometers, 
employing the standard Haversine formula.  
 
Table II.8 The relationship between managers at distance 
 Directorship 
Haversine distance -0.010 *** 
 (.0010) 
Constant -6.973 *** 
 (0.134) 
Pseudo-R2 0.017 
Observations 320,400 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
As shown in Table II.8, distant firms show a lower probability of 
mutual directors. In other words, we find a “local directors’ 
market” where firm tend to share directors when they are in the 
same sector and close by. Indeed, directors should have enough 
                                                             
28 The number of possible pairs in a given group of individuals is 
𝑛2−𝑛
2
. 
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time to attend meetings in the different boards of administration 
and that can be done efficiently when firms are in the same 
region. 
This means that some parts of the interlocking directorates 
spillovers’ aspect might be affected by geographical correlation. 
To control for that, we employ a SAC model, where the 
interlocking directorates matrix is linked with the spillover part 
ρW1Y, and the geographical matrix is in the error part λW2ε. This 
SAC model should represent an improvement of the SAR model 
where only the interlocking directorates effect is considered. For 
this reason, we prefer the SAC models to the interlocking 
directorates’ SAR model. 
 
Table II.9 AIC values for SAC models using geographical matrix as W1 and 
interlocking directorates’ matrix as W2 
 20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-off 
Linear distance 1250.580 
 
1249.393 
 
1248.148 
 
1249.585 
 
Squared distance 1251.530 1251.402 
 
1250.528 
 
1250.578 
 
The lowest value is underlined 
 
As in the previous case, Table II.9 shows that the model with the 
lowest AIC is the one which considers a linear distance with a 80 
Km cut-off.  
Since the chosen SAC model shows a smaller AIC value than the 
interlocking direcotrates SAR model, this model should be 
preferred. 
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Table II.10 Regressions results SAC with for interlocking directorates 
network (W1) and geographical distance (W2) 
 lnTFP 
Innovation 6.220*** 
(1.805) 
0 International 0.222*** 
(0.043) 
Intercept 8.003*** 
(0.681) 
Rho 0.277*** 
(0.061) 
Lambda 0.298** 
(0.138) 
Loglikelihood 
AIC 
-618.074 
 
2,205 Observations 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table II.11 SAC model with the chosen matrices 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 6.232*** 
(1.794) 
2.295** 
(0.904) 
8.528*** 
(2.523) 
International 0.229*** 
(0.045) 
0.084*** 
(0.028) 
0.313*** 
(0.065) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Regression results, shown in Tables II.10 and II.11, confirm our 
findings for Innovation and the FDI. P-values associated with 
indirect impacts are similar to the interlocking directorates' 
case, and the indirect effects are around 27% of total impacts (they 
were 29% in the SAR case). Moreover, since the coefficient 
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associated with lambda is positive and statistically significant at 
5% level (associated p-value 3%), there might be important 
missing variables related to geographical dimension. We can 
conclude that the interlocking directorates' spillovers are 
confirmed even when we control for distance. From a policy 
perspective, the innovation policy should target not only specific 
areas (such as firms, which patent and perform R&D expenses in 
undeveloped regions or science parks), but should also consider 
the interfirm networks. Indeed, targeted policies on central firms 
in the directors' network may have a positive effect on the 
productivity of connected firms. 
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
We perform a series of robustness checks to corroborate our 
findings. Specifically, we change the dependent variable to 
consider the natural logarithm of TFP estimated through: a 
LevPet technique (Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003) to control 
simultaneity bias, and an ACF technique (see Ackerberg et al., 
2015) to control for hiring/firing employee costs. We repeat the 
same regressions as before, that is to say the Least Squares model, 
the SAR model with interlocking directorates, and the SAC model 
with interlocking directorates and the geographical effect.  
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Table II.12 Regressions results for LS 
 LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 20.245*** 
(2.223) 
15.224*** 
(2.167) 
International 0.331*** 
(0.053) 
0.003 
(0.051) 
Intercept 5.630*** 
(0.031) 
4.431*** 
(0.030) 
R2 
Adjusted-R2 
0.130 
0.127 
 
0.058 
0.051 
Observations 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table II.13 Regressions results for geographical SAR 
 LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 18.679*** 
(2.168) 
14.457*** 
(2.149) 
International 0.323*** 
(0.051) 
0.004 
(0.051) 
Intercept 3.792*** 
(0.332) 
3.596*** 
(0.294) 
Rho 0.313*** 
(0.057) 
0.184*** 
(0.064) 
Loglikelihood 
AIC 
-767.254 
1544.5 
 
-757.109 
1524.2 
Observations 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses, p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table II.14 SAR model LevPet lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 18.954*** 
(2.193) 
8.405*** 
(2.353) 
27.350*** 
(3.776) 
International 0.328*** 
(0.052) 
() 
0.145*** 
(0.045) 
0.473*** 
(0.085) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table II.15 SAR model ACF lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 14.530*** 
(2.158) 
3.295** 
(1.499) 
17.826*** 
(2.986) 
International 0.004 
(0.051) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.063) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table II.16 Regressions results SAC with for interlocking directorates 
network in  W1 and geographical distance in W2 
 LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 17.796*** 
(2.163) 
00.308 
14.147*** 
(2.145) 
International 0.308*** 
(0.052) 
-0.004 
(0.051) 
Intercept 3.932*** 
(0.341) 
3.747*** 
(0.300) 
Rho 0.288*** 
(0.059) 
0.149*** 
(0.066) 
388 Lambda 0.398*** 
(0.128) 
0.388*** 
(0.129) 
Loglikelihood 
AIC 
-762.345 
1536.689 
2,205 
-752.842 
1517.685 
Observations 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table II.17 SAC model LevPet lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 17.950*** 
(2.192) 
6.990*** 
(2.238) 
24.940*** 
(3.737) 
International 0.309*** 
(0.044) 
0.121*** 
(0.044) 
0.430*** 
(0.091) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10*  
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Table II.18 SAC model ACF lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 13.886*** 
(1.960) 
2.343** 
(1.210) 
16.223*** 
(2.752) 
International -0.008 
(0.059) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.061) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10*  
 
In all models, our findings on the indirect effects of innovation do 
not substantially change. Indeed, they are always positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level. In more details, in the LevPet 
lnTFP estimation case, the indirect effects account for about 30% 
of the total effect whereas for ACF lnTFP, the indirect effect does 
not reach 20% of the total. 
There is a discrepancy between the baseline model and the ones 
used in robustness checks about the role of multinational 
companies: regressions with LevPet confirm the positive role of 
international companies for direct and indirect effects, but in 
regressions with ACF lnTFP, results are always statistically 
insignificant. All in all, the crucial role of innovation is confirmed 
in all of our robustness checks. 
5 Final discussion 
The main contribution of this chapter consists in studying the role 
of interfirm networks, such as interlocking directorates, for 
knowledge spillovers in a spatial econometrics framework. We 
show that interlocking directorates are important channels of 
knowledge spillovers among firms. This result holds even when 
we control for spatial spillovers and alternative methodologies to 
compute TFP. We contribute to the literature on spatial 
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knowledge spillovers by highlighting the key role of managerial 
interfirm networks. 
We find that interlocking directorates' spillovers through levels 
of firm innovation are strong and significant. Even though 
managerial connections do depend on geographical proximity 
since closer firms tend to share directories, when we employ 
spatial econometric models that also consider geographical 
aspect in the error part, to avoid that, the interlocking directorates 
might be affected by a latent effect of geographical proximity, we 
confirm our results. In general, SAC models with the 
geographical proximity in the error part should be preferred since 
they show lower values than SAR based on interlocking 
directorates' network (i.e., less information is lost as indicated by 
the AIC). As further robustness checks, we also consider different 
ways to compute the Total Factor Productivity. The new 
regressions confirm the main finding about innovation spillovers 
based on interlocking directorates' network. As for multinational 
companies, our findings are ambiguous since both direct and 
indirect effects are not robust compared to alternative way to 
compute TFP. 
All in all, our result contributes to the literature on knowledge 
spillovers, which is mostly focused on spatial effects and 
propinquity. In our analysis, we show that interfirm networks 
and managerial connections play a fundamental role in 
knowledge intensive industries. By targeting central firms in the 
directorship network, innovation policies can take advantage of 
productivity spillovers to peripheral firms. In other words, 
central firms are the ideal targets for innovation policies to boost 
firm productivity in science-based sectors. 
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Our work has some limitations. First, there is a problem of 
endogeneity, since more productive firms tend to have many 
links with other firms and to be central in managerial networks. 
Even though this is an important limitation of our study, it 
applies in the same way to the analysis of firm location choice (i.e. 
more productive firms tend to co-locate their activities in the 
same region, as discussed in Chapter 1). As future steps, we 
would like to build contiguity matrices with different interfirm 
networks such as ownership networks and strategic alliances. 
Here, we consider contiguity matrices through interlocking 
directorates. However, there exist other important connections 
among firms29 , which we did not consider due to lack of data. A 
rigorous approach should be developed to select the best 
combination of interfirm networks and models. Another 
important limitation of our work is the use of a static sample with 
only one year of observations whereas current work on spatial 
spillovers, such as by Wanzenboeck et al. (2015), employs panel 
data. This relevant restriction in our sample is due to the lack of 
panel data for the network of interlocking directorates. Since 
those data will become available in the next few years, we plan to 
extend our analysis to investigating variations across 
time and also further investigate the causal relationship between 
network formation and productivity.  
                                                             
29 For example, connections given by input/output firms, production claims, 
workers’ mobility, inventors’ mobility, R&D collaborations, mutual qualified 
owners, and temporary joint ventures might be also relevant for the innovation 
process. 
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III. The Italian Startup Act: 
Empirical Evidence and 
Policy Effects 
 
1 Introduction 
Small and young companies are often seen as the engine of 
innovation and growth. However, these companies are also 
known to be the most financially constrained (Himmelberg & 
Peterson, 1994; Schneider & Veugelers, 2009). This argument is 
especially pertinent for newly founded, innovative firms 
(Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). Capital market imperfections in 
financing R&D investments are usually put forward as a 
theoretical justification for public support to private R&D (Hall, 
2002). R&D investments are riskier than other investments with 
negative consequences both for ereay financing, as investors 
discount uncertainty, and for debt financing, since 
collateralization becomes problematic due to sunk costs and 
intangibles (Hall et al., 2016). Moreover, the problems of contract 
incompleteness and information asymmetry between firm and 
investors are exacerbated in the case of R&D financing (Hall & 
Lerner, 2010). As a result, innovative firms rely more on their own 
internal finance, when available. Market failures in innovation 
can be particularly severe in countries that lack well-functioning 
capital markets for innovative startups (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Italy, especially in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
followed by the economic recession and the sovereign debt crisis, 
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can be considered as one of those countries where the functioning 
of the financial markets became highly debatable, at the very 
least. The recognition that the crisis might have hit innovative, 
small and young firms more severely than other companies called 
for policy actions especially for these disadvantaged but 
potentially highly important companies for the economic growth 
(cf. OECD, 2009; OECD, 2014; and Bergner et al., 2017). 
As a response to the crisis, Italy passed the law 221 in 2012, which 
can be seen as an active high-tech startup policy. This policy 
scheme is a composite measure made of a set of complementary 
interventions aimed at unleashing the growth potential of 
innovative young and small companies. Among other features, it 
combines investment tax benefits, public loan guarantees and a 
more flexible labor legislation as benefits for the program 
participants. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a first look at the effects 
of this newly designed, and in the context of science and 
technology policy, innovative program to incent startup activity 
and to enhance the growth potential of innovative companies. We 
apply state-of-the-art econometric techniques to estimate 
treatment effects of the policy on relevant target variables at the 
firm-level. We mainly rely on difference-in-difference regressions 
with adequate control group designs but also address possible 
self-selection mechanisms and attrition.  
The remainder of this Chapter is as follows: the Section III.2 
introduces the data, the Section III.3 presents the empirical 
strategy, the Section III.4 show results, and the Section III.5 
concludes. 
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1.1 Theoretical Background 
As already experimented across the world, industrial policies to 
be effective must target a specific population of firms. Targeted 
firms can be selected according to multiple criteria such as age, 
size, region, industry, R&D propensity, etc.  
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have been one of the 
favorite targets of growth policies. Not all small and young firms 
have demonstrated the same incredible growth potential, but 
innovative startups are the ones, which can significantly 
contribute to growth and employment. Among them, the group 
of young enterprises, namely startups, have been identified as 
primary beneficiaries because of financial constraints problems 
and high growth potential. Timing and targeted regions of policy 
intervention are also critical, with a more massive impact during 
economic recessions and in depressed areas. The Italian law 
221/2012, also referred as Startup Act, represents a significant 
example of the evolution of industrial and innovative policy. 
Similar initiatives to support high-tech startup have been recently 
introduced in other countries such as: India (Companies Act 
2013), Latvia (2016), Austria (startup program 2017), Belgium 
(2017), the Netherlands (upcoming in 2018). 
The leading role of young and small firms in job creation is widely 
supported (Davis et al., 1996 and Criscuolo et al., 2014). Empirical 
evidence generally confirms firm size and age to be negatively 
correlated with rates of job creation and firm growth (Birch, 1981; 
Harhoff et al., 1998; Buldyrev et al., 2007; Headd & Kirchhoff, 
2009; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). It has been found that firm births 
account for a significant share of net job creation and since firms 
do not  grow much after an initial high growth period (Armington 
& Odle, 1982; Kirchhoff & Phillips, 1988; Audretsch & Mahmood, 
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1994; Broersma & Gautier, 1997; Voulgaris et al., 2005; Lotti, 2007). 
More importantly, it is noteworthy that not all small firms grow 
faster than larger firms but only the group of small and young firms 
(the so-called “gazelles”). 
The innovativeness of the small business sector is another 
argument brought up in the literature and policy debate to 
support SMEs incentives. However, as it is well known there is 
no linear, monotonic relationship between firm size and 
innovativeness (see among others Acs & Audretsch, 1988; 
Symeonidis, 1996; Freel, 2005; Hausman, 2005; Lee & Sung, 2005; 
Laforet & Tann, 2006; Baregheh et al., 2016). More compelling is 
the argument that problems in the acquisition of financing are 
particularly pronounced in the SME sector for many reasons: 
retrieving information on SMEs is more expensive, their 
securities are less frequently traded, and their financial 
statements do not have to be audited. The lack of assets to pledge 
as collateral is another problem of startups, particularly 
innovative newly founded firms centered around R&D activities. 
Information asymmetries between insiders and external potential 
investors and stakeholders are magnified by the overlap of 
ownership and management in most of the young and small 
firms. The theory thus suggests asymmetric information to 
induce an adverse selection, in particular about debt financing. 
Empirical evidence indeed confirms that the problems above 
cause an insufficient provision of capital to young, innovative and 
small firms (Audretsch &Lehmann, 2004; Freel, 2007; Stucki, 2013; 
Duarte et al. 2016; Bergner et al., 2017).  
This is the main rationale of  law 221/2012 targeting the group of 
innovative, high-growth and young small and micro firms in 
Italy, since they are the ones experiencing the highest demand for 
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capital and featuring specific characteristics complicating the 
acquisition of funds, especially during recessions (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004; North et al., 2013). 
This policy is meant to contribute to filling the gap between Italy 
and other OECD countries regarding high-tech startups and high 
skilled labor force. Italy is well-known to be the country with the 
most considerable fraction of micro (< 10 employees) and small 
firms (< 50 employees) among OECD countries. Also, small 
Italian firms account for the most relevant share of employment 
in OECD countries, well above 60% of total employment 
(Criscuolo et al., 2014). By taking a closer look at the age 
composition of small business, we notice that in Italy less than 
one-half of small companies are less than five years old. Among 
OECD countries, only Finland has a lower share of young firms 
(Criscuolo et al., 2014).30 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there has been a 
steep decline in the number and share of startup companies. This 
fact is extremely negative for a country like Italy, primarily by 
considering that young companies (up to five years after 
incorporation) contribute disproportionally to job creation. The 
Great Recession hit young firms relatively harder, but since when 
they have recovered faster from the crisis.  
 
 
                                                             
30 Also Japan’s share of young companies is lower than in Italy, but Japanese 
data are only available at the establishment level, thus no direct comparison is 
allowed. 
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1.2 The Italian for innovative startups: rational 
and potential impact 
In this chapter, we study the impact of the Italian law 221/2012 to 
support innovative startups. The primary goal of the policy 
intervention is "[...] to create favorable conditions for the 
establishment and the development of innovative enterprises to 
contribute significantly to economic growth and employment, 
especially youth employment." (Italian Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2014). The law 221/2012 includes several support 
measures as stated in the “Restart, Italia!” report by the Minister 
of Economic Development.  
The target enterprises of the policy are small newly incorporated 
companies headquartered in Italy with shared capital, which 
have been operational for less than 5 years and with a yearly 
turnover lower than 5 million euros. According to the Law, 
innovative startups must develop and commercialize innovative 
products or services of high technological value31, and they 
should fulfill at least one of the following criteria as reported in:  
 
(1) at least 15% of the company’s expenses can be 
attributed to research and development (R&D) 
activities;  
 
                                                             
31  The definition of innovation related to this law is quite wide, reading the list 
of registered innovative startups in 2017, we get among the others: companies 
that are involved in the production of soft drinks and wine; commercialization 
of jewels; preparation of typical Italian food; factories of mattresses. 
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(2) at least 1/3 of the e are PhD students, the holder of a 
PhD or researchers; alternatively, 2/3 of the total 
workforce must hold a Master’s degree; 
(3) the enterprise is the holder, depositary or licensee of a 
registered patent or software (industrial property).32 
Information extrapolated from MiSE (2016) 
 
As only a small group of young and upcoming enterprises 
accounts for the bulk of net job creation, law 221/2012 tries to 
target incentives more specifically to those firms.33  
Summing up, financial constraints, as a consequence of 
asymmetric information, high growth potential and job creation 
are the main arguments for a policy like the law 221/2012 
designed to sustain young innovative and small firms. Though 
those arguments are not sufficient to prove the effectiveness of 
public policies for innovative startups, those initiatives can play 
a role in countries like Italy when structural problems have been 
exacerbated by a prolonged financial and economic crisis. This 
context is, in principle, an ideal setting to test the impact of such 
a policy, also considering that the beneficiaries of the incentives 
have been accurately identified by the Law and monitored 
throughout the implementation of the policy. Indeed, firms that 
meet all the criteria set by law 221/2012 can register free of charge 
at a special register of ‘innovative startups’ and are entitled to the 
                                                             
32 Other requirements are not to have distributed profits and not to be the result 
of a merger, split-up or selling-off of a company or branch. 
33 Similar legislations offering special reliefs for newly founded SMEs and their 
shareholders have been set in place in France and Portugal (Bergner et al., 2017). 
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benefits of the new legislative framework. This aspect of the 
policy is particularly important to evaluate the impact of the new 
legislation, since it rules out any risk of contamination of the 
treated group of firms (only registered firms get access to the 
benefits of the policy, with no exception). The main benefits for 
innovative startups can be divided into three categories: (a) tax 
incentives for equity investments; (b) an easy procedure to get 
credit guarantees on bank loans; and (c) tailored made labor rules 
to subscribe fixed-term contract which lasts up to the end of the 
fourth year of a startup's life. Investors in innovative startups get 
a 30% tax credit as individuals and fiscal deduction as legal 
entities (as of 2016). As for credit guarantees, it covers  up to 80% 
of the bank loans and up to a maximum of 2.5 m EUR, and it is 
provided through a Government Fund called “Fondo Centrale di 
Garanzia.”34 When firms are no more eligible for the benefits of the 
policy, they exit the “innovative startup” register, and special 
treatments immediately stop. A report is published every year by 
the Italian Ministry of Industry, providing an in-depth analysis of 
the evolution of the policy, its impact and cost (MiSE, 2015). 
Since the main interventions are on equity investments, access to 
bank loans and employment, we will focus first on whether this 
new policy has spurred equity collection, bank loans and creation 
of new jobs by startup firms, conditional upon survival. Thus, we 
                                                             
34 The list of benefits to innovative startups includes other aspects like easy 
access to equity crowdfunding, a waiver to the ratio of fixed-term/open-ended 
labor contracts (i.e. innovative startups can have only fixed-term employees). 
Other benefits are a special service for internationalization, no registration fees 
and annual fees due to Chambers of Commerce, and a special regulation for 
bankruptcy.  
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will investigate the impact of the policy on productivity, value-
added and job creation.  
 
2 Data and preliminary 
evidence 
To evaluate the impacts of the program, we merge the participant 
data as published by the Ministry of Economic Development for 
the years 2013 to 2015 with firm-level (accounting) data from the 
AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk for the years 2007 to 2015.  
As the policy program is focused on startup companies we restrict 
our sample to small enterprises, i.e. medium-sized and large 
companies are omitted from the analysis upfront. Small 
companies are defined by the European Commission as having 
fewer than 50 employees and at most € 10 million sales. 
In addition, we omit firms from highly regulated industries or 
industries with a high share of publicly owned firms, such as 
agriculture (NACE rev. 2 A industries), quarrying and mining 
(NACE rev. 2 B industries), utilities and waste management 
industries (NACE rev. 2 D and E industries), as well as financial, 
bank, real estate, insurance industries. Note that less than 2.5% of 
program participants are active in these sectors. Therefore, we 
drop only a negligible share of participating companies by 
applying this industry restriction.  
Furthermore, we apply some outlier cleaning to the data in order 
to avoid that our empirical results are determined by potentially 
erroneous entries in the AIDA database. Accordingly, we delete 
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all small firms, which show an amount of equity greater than 20 
m EUR, or bank debts more than 10 m EUR35.  
Our final sample consists of 403,339 Italian small enterprises 
including 1,580 program participants. As we observe firms for 
multiple years, the resulting unbalanced panel contains 2,152,839 
firm-year observations. 
 
Table III.1 Description of the main variables, all firms 
VARIABLES mean min max Correlation  
Cap. st. Bank Workers VA  
Capital stock 68.62 0 20,000 1     
Bank debts 192.51 0 10,000 0.1787 1    
Workers 2.48 0 49 0.0931 0.1875 1   
Value-added* 252.02 0 7,388 0.0262 0.1720 0.6554 1  
         
 
Since the Startup Act has explicitly effects on capital stock, bank 
loans and number of employees we first focus our analysis on the 
direct impact of the policy. Moreover, the policy should also 
enhance value-added and labor productivity (measured as value-
added per worker). In our sample, the mean capital stock is about 
69 k EUR, the average bank debts are more than 190 k EUR, and 
the mean number of workers per firm is less than three. It is 
important to highlight that entrepreneurs, who work actively in 
their firms, but are not registered at National Social Security 
Authority (called “INPS”), they are not counted as workers. 
Indeed, the fact that, on average, small firms have fewer than 
                                                             
35 As a total, about 6% of selected firms. 
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three employees, means that in the majority exclusively owners 
with their families work in their enterprises. In a second phase we 
study whether the increasing availability of capital and qualified 
labor force translates into higher survival rates, firm productivity 
and contribution to GDP. 
In our sample of SMEs the three most treated representative 
industries (computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities; scientific R&D; information service activities) represent 
more than 50% of total innovative startups (see Table III.2). 
Conversely, these three industries represent only the 5% of the 
untreated companies. Looking at the geographic composition of 
our sample (Table III.3), we notice that just two provinces (Roma 
and Milano), have around one-fourth of the total analyzed 
enterprises and innovative startups. This is not surprising since 
they are the most important provinces in Italy: Rome is the official 
political capital and Milan represents the most developed 
financial and business district, where many MNEs locate their 
Italian headquarters. We notice that treated companies tend to be 
located in the northern part of the country. This is partially due 
to a different composition by sector, with high-tech companies 
which tend to be located in the most innovative areas of the 
country (see also results in Chapter 1). 
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Table III.2 Most treated representative industries by number of firms 
NACE 2 Untreated Treated 
 Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
62-Computer programming, 
consultancy and related activities 
9,814 2.43 487 30.82 
72-Scientific research and 
development 
1,454 0.36 283 17.91 
63-Information service activities 9,733 2.41 98 6.20 
71-Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
8,699 2.16 84 5.32 
26-Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 
2,353 0.58 80 5.06 
28-Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
5,731 1.42 71 4.49 
74-Other professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
7,913 1.96 63 3.99 
70-Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy 
activities 
17,797 4.41 55 3.48 
27-Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 
2,533 0.63 45 2.85 
46-Wholesale trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
46,369 11.49 30 1.90 
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Table III.3 Most treated representative NUTS-3 regions  
NUTS-3 Italian region Untreated Treated 
 Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Milano (Center-North) 38,508 9.54 221 13.99 
Roma (Center-North) 53,956 13.37 145 9.18 
Torino (Center-North) 11,718 2.90 93 5.89 
Bologna (Center-North) 7,621 1.89 56 3.54 
Napoli (South) 20,629 5.11 56 3.54 
Trento (Center-North) 3,192 0.79 53 3.35 
Modena (Center-North) 5,742 1.42 43 2.72 
Firenze (Center-North) 7,217 1.79 39 2.47 
Padova (Center-North) 6,343 1.57 36 2.28 
Brescia (Center-North) 9,037 2.24 26 1.65 
 
3 Empirical strategy 
For the identification of policy effects, we mainly rely on 
difference-in-difference regressions (see e.g. Angrist & Pischke, 
2009, 2015). We compare capital stock, debt, employment, total 
value-added and labor productivity of participating companies 
before and after the policy was launched in December 2012. 
Possible differences are related to a control group of non-
participating firms. We will present a number of robustness tests 
that basically rest on the idea to make the control group 
comparable to the treatment group in several dimensions. 
Initially, we start to use all small firms that did not register for the 
program as control group. Subsequently, we narrow the control 
group gradually to see how the estimated treatment effects vary. 
Finally, we also consider Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and 
Mahalanobis Matching to mitigate the selection bias problem in 
the analysis (Arnold & Javorcik, 2009). 
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In the most simple textbook case, a difference-in-difference 
estimation may consist only of two time periods (T=2), one before 
(t0) and one after (t1) a policy change. The difference-in-difference 
estimator would amount then to calculate the difference in an 
outcome variable, y, for the treated companies as well as for the 
control group, calculate the means of these two differences and 
subtract the averge difference of the controls from the average 
difference of the treated companies. This would be equivalent to 
running the regression 
  
Equation III.1 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    with i = 1,…, N, 
and treatment is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the 
program participants, and zero for the control group. If desired, 
one could add exogenous control variables, X, such that 
  
Equation III.2 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
This is also equivalent to running a fixed effects “within” 
regression: 
  
Equation III.3 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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The advantage of the latter specification is that a difference-in-
difference estimation can also be easily implemented for T>2. In 
that case the variable treatment is a dummy variable that is 
always zero for all firms before the policy change, and it switches 
to one for the program participants as soon as they participate in 
the program. 
The difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator is usually applied to 
situation where a policy affects a subpopulation of companies, 
e.g. all small and young firms in an economy. In that case, the 
firms cannot self-select into treatment. It is exogenously 
determined which firms are in the treatment group and which 
firms are in the control group. In our set-up, the firms can self-
select into the treatment, however. This bears some potential for 
a bias in the estimation as the firms may have different 
participation probabilities. For instance, there might be some 
firms that expect less benefits from the program than others and 
therefore do not select into the program. These firms may not 
have a growth interest in the first place and are therefore not a 
good control group. In order to address the self-selection 
problem, we also conduct so-called conditional difference-in-
difference estimations where we try to adjust the control group 
such that it has a similar participation likelihood as the treated 
firms. In that case, one would assume that the firms are either 
treated or not only because of purely random shocks. In practice, 
it means that we gradually narrow the control group to become 
as similar as possible to the treatment group. 
As discussed in the literature, the standard errors in DiD 
applications might be biased because of autocorrelation and the 
so-called Moulton bias. We address this concern by clustering the 
standard errors at a higher level (province level) than the 
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observational unit, as recommended in the literature (see the 
discussion in Bertrand et al., 2004, or Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  
Our first DID specification implemented as fixed effects panel 
regression is: 
 
Equation III.4 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
with i= 1… N (firms) and t=2007…2015 (years). 
 
In this regression our dependent variables (yit) are: capital stock 
in thousands of Euros, bank loans in thousands of Euros, the 
number of employees, value-added in thousands of Euros and 
value-added per worker in thousands of Euros (as proxy for labor 
productivity), and we also consider the natural logarithms of 
these variables. Given our goal to evaluate the policy, our 
principal independent variable is represented by the treatment 
status (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡). We add also a startup dummy 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 as an 
additional control of eligibility. This dummy variable is one in 
case firm i is at most 5 years old and has 5 million in revenues, 
otherwise 0. Moreover, we insert a full set of time dummies (Xit) 
to control for macro-economics shocks that might affect all firms. 
We first consider all small firms, then we adjust the control group 
by selecting a sample of untreated firms that show similar size 
and age as the treated group. We limit the control group to 
companies which do not exceed 2.5 m EUR in revenue at least one 
year during our sample period and are at most 5 years in 2013. 
For example, a company founded in 2009 with 1 million in 
revenue will be incluced in the sample. The choice of 2.5 m EUR 
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is due to the observation that the largest innovative startup has 
revenues around 2 m EUR. Thereby, including companies with 3 
or 4 m EUR in revenues may create a not appropriate control 
group. Moreover, we do no longer include companies founded in 
2007, because they were six years old in 2013.   
In a futher regression, we also limit the inlcuded sectors to those 
that have most treated companies. 
The model specification is similar to the one used in the previous 
case, but this time we also insert a post-treatment dummy (called 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) to avoid that formerly treated firms enter the 
control group of never-treated ones and to observe if the effects 
continue after the treatment period. The post-treatment dummy 
takes  the value 1 once the firm drops out of the program because 
it became too large, too old, or it loses some mandatory 
requiriments for an innovative startup.  
The new specification for the main analysis is 
 
Equation III.5 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
with i= 1… N (firms) and t= 2008…2015 (years). 
 
We also search for heterogeneous treatment effects by treatment 
year, and by the Italian geographical area (North vs. South): 
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Equation III.6 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ [𝛾1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∙ (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) ]
2015
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟=2013
+ 𝛾2
∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
with i= 1… N (firms) and t= 2008…2015 (years), and 
 
Equation III.7 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑛 ∙ (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾1𝑠 ∙ (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾2
∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
with i= 1… N (firms) and t= 2008…2015 (years). 
 
Another concern might be attrition. It could happen that program 
participants are more or less likely to survive than non-treated 
firms. On the one hand, treated firms may be able to make more 
risky investment because of improved access to equity and loans. 
Failures of such more risky investment projects may increase the 
probability of bankruptcy and thus exit (relative to the control 
group). On the other hand, the improved access to capital may 
also allow the companies to implement their business plans 
appropriately which might not have been possible without the 
program participation. As a result, firms with well implemented 
business plans might also survive longer. In order to account for 
attrition, we follow Wooldridge (2010: chapter 19) and estimated 
a series of probit regression on an indicator variable for survival. 
We estimate a cross-section probit model for each year t 
separately (always with the sample that was alive in t-1). From 
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these probit models, we obtain the linear predictions and we 
calculate the inverse Mills’ ratio which is then included in the DiD 
regression as selection term accounting for attrition.  
 
Equation III.8 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
with i= 1… N (firms) and t= 2008…2015 (years). 
 
Finally, as a further robustness checks, we also consider 
Propensity Score Matching and Mahalanobis Matching. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Preliminary results 
 
In this Section, we show our findings on the effects of the Startup 
Act.  Since this law provides direct incentives for collecting capital 
stock, receiving bank loans and hiring people, we study the 
effects of these three variables (direct effects) and also consider 
their logarithm values as robustness check. Then, we will estimate 
the impact of the policy on firms’ value-added and productivity. 
Table III.4 shows that the coefficients associated with the start 
dummy are negative and significant. This means, as easily to 
predict, that young firms usually have fewer resources such as 
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equity and bank debts. Also, for this reason, a growth policy, such 
as the Startup Act, may be desirable.  
 
Table III.4 Treatment effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cap stk Bank Workers lncapstk lnbank lnworkers 
Start -3.760*** -6.720*** -0.248*** -0.019*** -0.060*** -0.044*** 
 (0.678) (1.227) (0.009) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Treatment 26.038*** 45.167*** 1.091*** 0.218*** 0.803*** 0.262*** 
 (8.791) (4.212) (0.071) (0.021) (0.055) (0.018) 
Constant 69.789*** 185.406*** 2.789*** 2.952*** 2.277*** 0.637*** 
 (0.765) (1.394) (0.010) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,152,839 2,152,839 2,152,839 2,152,839 2,152,839 2,152,839 
Firms 403,339 403,339 403,339 403,339 403,339 403,339 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.040 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
We also find positive treatment effects of the policy. In all 
regressions, the coefficient associated with the treatment variable 
is positive and significant at 1% level. Specifically, the treated 
firms have about 26 000 Euros more in equity, 45 000 Euros more 
in bank loans and they hire 1.1 workers more after they have 
entered the program than the companies in the control group.  
Similar findings are shown in all cases, where we consider the 
logarithm values.  
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4.2 Refining the control group 
 
In the preliminary analysis, we considered the entire sample of 
Italian Small Enterprises (fewer than 50 employees and 10 million 
in revenues). Since we find that revenues for registered 
innovative startups do never exceed the amount of 2.5 m EUR (the 
limit of 5 m EUR has not been very binding), we select as the 
control group firms that are comparable in size and age to the 
treated companies, but that have never joined the program 
during our sample period. This means that our control group is 
made of firms that were at most five years old in 2013 and show 
at most 2.5 m EUR in revenues. These rules may define more 
appropriate control group of firms, because they are quite similar 
to the treated ones. 
As reported in Table III.5, also in this case, the treatment effects 
are strongly significant and positive. However, the magnitude of 
the effects is somewhat smaller than in the previous case. 
In this analysis, we added also the post-treatment variable. In this 
way, we avoid that the post-treated firms are considered as never 
treated ones and we can observe if effects continue after the 
treatment. In the specific case, the post-treatment effect is positive 
and significant. For this reason, we can also conclude that the 
effects do not terminate with the treatment period, but they 
persist at least two years after the firms dropped out of the 
program as they became ineligible. The positive post-treatment 
effect represents a strong argument to advocate this policy. 
Indeed, one of the primary concerns in temporary subsidy 
policies consists in obtaining only temporary effects, which 
vanish after the conclusion of the policy. 
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Table III.5 Treatment and post-treatment effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cap stk Bank Workers ln(Capstk) ln(Bank) ln(Workers) 
              
Treatment 27.536*** 20.859*** 0.738*** 0.202*** 0.541*** 0.185*** 
 (10.495) (3.453) (0.076) (0.021) (0.052) (0.020) 
Post-treatment 20.431** 25.232* 0.655*** 0.189*** 0.479** 0.184*** 
 (8.698) (13.046) (0.196) (0.034) (0.212) (0.058) 
Constant 21.156*** 6.696 0.568*** 2.534*** 0.397*** 0.150*** 
 (3.569) (5.079) (0.060) (0.004) (0.039) (0.014) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 433,169 433,169 433,169 433,169 433,169 
Firms 117,262 117,262 117,262 117,262 117,262 117,262 
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.050 0.008 0.054 0.091 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
4.3 An analysis of the policy impact on 
firm growth and productivity 
 
So far, we focused on variables such as capital stock and bank 
loans, which cannot be considered as the final goal for a policy. 
Indeed, one of the real goals of a Government policy should be to 
increase total production and the level of employment. For what 
concerns employment level, we have already demonstrated in the 
previous subsection that the Startup Act helped creating some 
additional jobs. Moreover, these “additional” positions remain 
also in the post-treatment phase. In this section we turn our 
attention to the indirect effects of the policy on total production, 
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GDP growth and productivity. It might happen that firms have 
collected more capital stock due to tax benefits, but no real 
productive investment has been made. Namely, the additional 
amount of collected equity does not imply additional investments 
and a consequent increase in total production. In other words, we 
may observe a moral hazard behavior, as described in the 
literature on firm subsidies (Gustafsson et al., 2016; de Blasio et 
al., 2017), where entrepreneurs act in bad faith to embezzle public 
resources, or private investments can be displaced by the 
subsidies. 
For all these reasons, we estimate the treatment and post-
treatment effects on value-added, value-added per worker 
(productivity) and total employment for innovative startups. We 
consider also a more restricted sample of firms in the most 
‘innovative’ sectors. So far, we have analyzed various industries, 
some of which are not the typical target of innovative policies.  
Indeed, one may assert that the positive effects of the policy we 
found depend on the selected target of innovative startups in 
high-tech sectors and consultancy. Indeed, one may argue that hi-
tech companies, regardless of the official ‘innovative startup’ 
status, create ceteris paribus higher levels of value-added. 
Similarly, one may think that young high-tech firms hire more 
people because of their potential growth, even if they do not 
benefit of a special labor legislation. 
For this reason, we would like to analyze whether the conclusions 
still hold for a sample of treated and untreated firms belonging 
only to these industries. We also limit the control group again to 
firms of similar age and size in high-tech sectors. In this way, we 
can estimate if the new policy is really effective in increasing 
survival, growth and competitiveness of innovative startups.  
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As shown in Table III.6, we observe a significant positive impact 
of the policy on total value-added. This effect persists also in the 
post-treatment phase, with an effect estimates of around 60 k EUR 
per firm. Restriction to high-tech sectors, does not significantly 
modify our main result about the effectiveness of the policy. 
Similar results are obtained also when turn to labor productivity 
and employment (Table III.7). 
In another set of regressions, we estimate annual treatment effects 
instead of a time-constant average. We create three dummy 
variables: treatment2013, treatment2014, treatment2015 to see how 
the policy works over the years. As we can observe from the Table 
III.9, the treatment effects increase year by year. This growing 
trend may be due to the typical time lag needed to observe the 
actual impact of a new policy. For example, in our case, firms 
need some months to collect capital stocks or receive loans from 
banks, and the final effect on the total production may be delayed. 
As before, also in this case we observe a significant and positive 
effect in the post-treatment phase, that means that also controlling 
by treatment year, the policy produces desirable effects. Similar 
results are found for the labor productivity and employment 
levels (see Table III.10 and Table III.11). 
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Table III.6 Value-added analysis for eligible startup sample and selected 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA VA ln(VA) ln(VA) 
Treatment 45.109*** 43.600*** 0.941*** 0.998*** 
 (4.295) (4.607) (0.046) (0.057) 
Post-treatment 63.326*** 65.852*** 0.743*** 0.870*** 
 (22.525) (20.077) (0.158) (0.158) 
Constant 36.242*** 40.590*** 2.002*** 2.262*** 
 (2.670) (4.289) (0.034) (0.051) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.057 0.063 0.105 0.094 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table III.7 Value-added per worker analysis for eligible startup sample and 
selected industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA/wrk VA/wrk ln(VA/wrk) ln(VA/wrk) 
Treatment 20.345*** 19.981*** 0.756*** 0.824*** 
 (2.323) (2.654) (0.050) (0.057) 
Post-treatment 27.981*** 30.226** 0.559*** 0.698*** 
 (10.428) (12.001) (0.122) (0.131) 
Constant 24.126*** 36.704*** 1.852*** 2.203*** 
 (1.795) (2.850) (0.024) (0.044) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.063 0.056 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table III.8 Employment analysis for eligible startup sample and selected 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Workers Workers ln(Workers) ln(Workers) 
Treatment 0.738*** 0.698*** 0.185*** 0.175*** 
 (0.076) (0.097) (0.020) (0.027) 
Post-treatment 0.655*** 0.665*** 0.184*** 0.172** 
 (0.196) (0.247) (0.058) (0.068) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.059*** 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.014) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.050 0.063 0.091 0.085 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table III.9 Value-added analysis for eligible startup sample and selected 
industries by treatment year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA VA ln(VA) ln(VA) 
Treatment 2013 27.631*** 25.145*** 0.548*** 0.580*** 
 (6.952) (6.584) (0.070) (0.084) 
Treatment 2014 40.671*** 41.445*** 0.843*** 0.910*** 
 (5.158) (5.156) (0.052) (0.063) 
Treatment 2015 60.388*** 58.908*** 1.282*** 1.384*** 
 (4.884) (5.486) (0.054) (0.064) 
Post-treatment 58.462*** 62.432*** 0.634*** 0.785*** 
 (22.120) (21.007) (0.134) (0.150) 
Constant 36.247*** 40.597*** 2.002*** 2.262*** 
 (2.670) (4.288) (0.034) (0.051) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.057 0.063 0.105 0.095 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table III.10 Value-added per worker analysis for eligible startup sample and 
selected industries by treatment year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA/wrk VA/wrk ln(VA/wrk) ln(VA/wrk) 
Treatment 2013 12.806*** 11.609*** 0.465*** 0.503*** 
 (3.503) (4.347) (0.063) (0.077) 
Treatment 2014 19.142*** 19.465*** 0.691*** 0.761*** 
 (2.649) (2.878) (0.054) (0.064) 
Treatment 2015 26.271*** 26.474*** 1.002*** 1.114*** 
 (3.497) (3.749) (0.062) (0.064) 
Post-treatment 26.087** 28.765** 0.481*** 0.634*** 
 (10.809) (12.385) (0.125) (0.137) 
Constant 24.127*** 36.706*** 1.852*** 2.203*** 
 (1.795) (2.849) (0.024) (0.044) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.063 0.057 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
Table III.11 Value-added per worker analysis for eligible startup sample and 
selected industries by treatment year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Workers Workers ln(Workers) ln(Workers) 
Treatment 2013 0.328*** 0.288*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 
 (0.078) (0.089) (0.023) (0.026) 
Treatment 2014 0.658*** 0.642*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 
 (0.089) (0.110) (0.023) (0.030) 
Treatment 2015 1.074*** 1.048*** 0.280*** 0.270*** 
 (0.091) (0.118) (0.024) (0.032) 
Post-treatment 0.547*** 0.587** 0.153*** 0.151** 
 (0.184) (0.236) (0.057) (0.067) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.059*** 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.014) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.050 0.064 0.092 0.086 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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As we have seen in the first Chapter the gap between the 
Northern area and the Southern part of Italy has been widening 
after the Great Recession. Specifically, the Northern part has a 
developed economy (partially included in the European Blue 
Banana) with efficient firms and institutions. Conversely, the 
Southern part often meets more difficulties into innovation and 
economic progress, because it has an undeveloped infrastructure 
system and a fragile industrial base. To analyze the impact of the 
Startup Act in the two areas, we repeat the treatment analysis 
with a dummy variable for firms located in the Southern part of 
the country (called ‘Mezzogiorno’, in Italian). We got from Table 
III.12 that the treatment effects vary according to geography. In 
the Northern part, the treatment effect on value-added is higher 
in absolute values than in the South, where the effect is of about 
37 000 Euros versus over 47 000 Euros as an average in the North. 
Conversely, regarding the study of relative values (through 
natural logarithm), we find that the effect on value-added is 
larger in the Southern part of the country. Thus, this fact may 
mean that the relative effect is higher in the South, but Southern 
potential startups have a lower initial value-added. This gap in 
the impact of the policy is reduced when we restrict the sample 
to innovative sectors. Therefore, the gap of the treatment between 
the North and South is partially due to different sector 
composition. Additionally, the effect on productivity is higher in 
the North, and this time the impact does not change if we restrict 
our analysis to innovative sectors. As for the employment 
analysis, we do not observe very different effects between North 
and South: in both geographical areas, the effect is around +0.7 
employees per treated startup. But when we focus on the 
innovative sectors the employment effect is more pronounced in 
the South. All in all, we can conclude that the growth of value-
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added for Northern treated firms is mostly due to a positive effect 
on labor productivity, whereas the main impact in the South is on 
job creation.  
 
Table III.12 Geographical effects on value-added 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA VA ln(VA) ln(VA) 
          
Treatment north 47.217*** 43.855*** 0.913*** 0.956*** 
 (4.564) (4.660) (0.050) (0.058) 
Treatment south 37.453*** 42.653*** 1.042*** 1.155*** 
 (9.098) (11.215) (0.124) (0.150) 
Post-treatment 63.888*** 65.914*** 0.736*** 0.860*** 
 (21.307) (20.272) (0.134) (0.147) 
Constant 36.242*** 40.590*** 2.002*** 2.262*** 
 (2.668) (4.288) (0.034) (0.051) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.057 0.063 0.103 0.094 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table III.13 Geographical effects on value-added per worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA/wrk VA/wrk ln(VA/wrk) ln(VA/wrk) 
Treatment north 21.935*** 21.135*** 0.728*** 0.788*** 
 (2.662) (3.181) (0.055) (0.059) 
Treatment south 14.567*** 15.698*** 0.857*** 0.956*** 
 (2.467) (2.493) (0.135) (0.169) 
Post-treatment 28.405*** 30.507** 0.552*** 0.689*** 
 (10.379) (11.961) (0.122) (0.131) 
Constant 24.125*** 36.703*** 1.852*** 2.203*** 
 (1.793) (2.846) (0.023) (0.044) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.063 0.0056 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table III.14 Geographical effects on value-added per worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Workers Workers ln(Workers) ln(Workers) 
Treatment north 0.740*** 0.675*** 0.185*** 0.168*** 
 (0.078) (0.099) (0.019) (0.025) 
Treatment south 0.731*** 0.787*** 0.185*** 0.199*** 
 (0.195) (0.245) (0.058) (0.074) 
Post-treatment 0.655*** 0.659*** 0.184*** 0.171** 
 (0.196) (0.246) (0.057) (0.067) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.059*** 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.014) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 433,169 76,940 433,169 76,940 
Firms 117,262 20,000 117,262 20,000 
R-squared 0.050 0.063 0.091 0.085 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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As a further investigation and robustness check, we consider the 
effect of firm survival and potential selection bias in our analysis 
by including Mills’ ratio in our regressions. Indeed, different 
average survival rates between treated and untreated firms could 
introduce a bias in the analysis. Thus, in the following regression, 
we include Mills’ ratio. Once again, our general findings about 
the effectiveness of the policy still do hold. Namely, the Startup 
Act has a positive impact on the three main variables of interest 
in the post-treatment phase.  
 
Table III.15 Treatment effects on value-added and Mills’ ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA VA ln(VA) ln(VA) 
Treatment 21.481*** 13.367*** 0.696*** 0.741*** 
 (4.149) (4.965) (0.048) (0.055) 
Post-treatment 69.883*** 64.603*** 0.804*** 0.857*** 
 (21.168) (19.820) (0.141) (0.151) 
Mills’ ratio -930.992*** -1,010.799*** -9.387*** -8.353*** 
 (48.015) (72.128) (0.310) (0.439) 
Constant 41.988*** 44.547*** 2.057*** 2.284*** 
 (2.458) (5.205) (0.040) (0.067) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 416,950 74,085 416,950 74,085 
Firms 112,963 19,264 112,963 19,264 
 
 
R-squared 0.067 0.076 0.115 0.104 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table III.16 Treatment effects on value-added per worker and Mills’ ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES VA/wrk VA/wrk ln(VA/wrk) ln(VA/wrk) 
Treatment 17.131*** 14.606*** 0.590*** 0.650*** 
 (2.317) (2.745) (0.053) (0.057) 
Post-treatment 28.287*** 29.343** 0.597*** 0.685*** 
 (10.452) (12.025) (0.131) (0.137) 
Mills ratio -104.667*** -149.483*** -6.187*** -5.456*** 
 (15.628) (24.602) (0.264) (0.386) 
Constant 24.768*** 36.946*** 1.886*** 2.214*** 
 (1.769) (3.047) (0.026) (0.055) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 416,950 74,085 416,950 74,085 
Firms 112,963 19,264 112,963 
 
19,264 
R-squared 0.067 0.076 0.115 0.104 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
 
Table III.17 Treatment effects on value-added per worker and Mills’ ratio 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Workers Workers ln(Workers) ln(Workers) 
Treatment 0.417*** 0.386*** 0.106*** 0.091*** 
 (0.082) (0.112) (0.021) (0.028) 
Post-treatment 0.758*** 0.667*** 0.207*** 0.172*** 
 (0.175) (0.235) (0.055) (0.065) 
Mills ratio -13.515*** -11.144*** -3.200*** -2.897*** 
 (0.466) (0.863) (0.089) (0.167) 
Constant 0.650*** 0.230*** 0.170*** 0.070*** 
 (0.069) (0.077) (0.016) (0.017) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 416,950 74,085 416,950 74,085 
Firms 112,963 19,264 112,963 
 
19,264 
R-squared 0.056 0.070 0.101 0.095 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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As shown in Table III.15, the treatment and post-treatment effects 
on value-added are always positive and statistically significant. 
The persistency of the effects in the post-treatment phase should 
be confirmed in future research, since we have only a few years 
of data available after treatment and about one hundred post-
treament observations in our sample. 
The impact of the Startup Act’s costs for the Italian taxpayer 
should also be considered. Indeed, the cost of the policy is mostly 
to the partial tax exemption. Also public guarantees are provided 
for bankrupted firms under the loan guarantee program, and firm 
registration fees are lowered. For these reasons, we compute a 
back-of-the-envelope estimate of the cost of the policy, which 
include lower tax collection, losses for the guarantee fund, and 
exemptions for administrative fees (in the sample period 2013-
2015). After some simple computations, we get that the costs of 
the policy were 6.5 m EUR in 2013, 11 m EUR in 2014, and 12 m 
EUR in 2015. The cost compares to the benefits of the policy. We 
found that each “former startup” in the post-treatment phase has 
30 k/60 k EUR in value-added more than untreated firms, and 
assuming that each year 2,000 firms will move to the post-
treatment phase, the overall effect on value-added will be of 
about 60 m/120 m EUR a year. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the Startup Act is going to the right direction, since generated 
benefits seems to exceed the policy costs. However, more time is 
needed to better estimate the post-treatment effect on different 
aspects, e.g. the duration of post-treatment effects, additional 
taxation that State can collect from the production increase, the 
real number of firms in the post-treatment phase, etc. 
 
By considering the value-added per worker, we see that the 
policy has a positive impact on labor productivity too. Once again 
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as main result we have that the positive effect does not dissapear 
after treatment period, but it persists over time. The post-
treatment on treated firms is about 25 k-30 k EUR per employee. 
Theoretically, this effect can translate into higher salaries for 
workers, who have higher labor productivity. Ultimaltely, the 
post-treatment effect on employment is around 0.7 new positions 
per former treated firm. Assuming that 2,000 firms pass each year 
into the post-treatment phase, we get a positve contribution of 
1,500 more jobs per year. The employment effect is positive, but 
negigible if we consider that Italian workforce is composed by 
around 20 m/25 m employees. 
 
4.4 Propensity Score Matching 
 
As another robustness check, we employ a Propensity Score 
Matching technique, which considers for the sample selection the 
intangible assets, and R&D expenses. We choose to consider 
intangible assets and R&D expenses, because they may be linked 
with innovative startup eligibility criteria. Intangible assets may 
be seen as a proxy of the presence of patents or software. The R&D 
expenses are linked with the criteria that required at least 15% of 
R&D expenses over the total.  Using a Propensity Score Matching, 
we would like to reduce the selection bias that may affect our 
conclusions. In particular, we are interested to see if  post-
treatment effects hold.  
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Table III.18 Treatment and post-treatment effects using a Propensity Score 
Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES VA VA/wrk Workers ln(VA) ln(VA/wrk) ln(Workers) 
              
Treatment 29.336*** 16.683*** 0.599*** 0.839*** 0.698*** 0.142*** 
 (4.962) (2.518) (0.093) (0.054) (0.056) (0.024) 
Post-treatment 44.140* 24.066* 0.529*** 0.660*** 0.522*** 0.138** 
 (26.365) (12.461) (0.188) (0.154) (0.146) (0.053) 
Constant 16.104 23.632*** 0.080 1.713*** 1.651*** 0.062* 
 (12.502) (5.401) (0.185) (0.136) (0.126) (0.036) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,223 15,223 15,223 15,223 15,223 15,223 
Firms 4,358 4,358 4,358 4,358 4,358 4,358 
R-squared 0.103 0.019 0.080 0.184 0.118 0.119 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
From Table III.18, we can state that  for all analyzed variables 
post-treatment effects are positive and significant. In particular, 
the post-treatment is high significant when we consider the 
natural logarithm of the variables such as value-added and value-
added per worker. Once again, we can conclude that policy is 
working well also when the treatment program is over. However, 
more years of post-treatment may be necessary to have the correct 
conclusions on the real effectiveness of the duration of post-
treatment phase.  
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4.5 Mahalanobis matching 
 
As a further robustness control, we apply the Mahalanobis 
matching36 to refine our control group of untreated firms. In 
particular, we consider only small firms founded in the first half 
of 2012. We choose the first half of 2012, because in the first half 
2012 nobody could forsee the launch of the Startup Act (which 
was set with a governmental decree in October 2012 and entered 
into force in December 2012), thereby these firms could not have 
be founded on purpose to benefit of Startup Act. Additionally, by 
limiting the control group to the firms founded in first half of 
2012, we exclude firms active before the Startup Act have which 
have already distributed profits (according to the policy an 
innovative startup must have never distributed profits). In this 
way the control group of untreated firms is very similar to the 
treated firms for their ex-ante characteristics. In this case, he 
independent variable is “ever_mise” assumes value 1 when the 
firm is, or used to be, under treatment. We use a Mahalanobis 
matching, which considers as continuous variables the natural 
logarithm of revenues and ROA (return on assets). The choice of 
logarithm of revenues is to avoid that the probability to be treated 
is in function of the size. The ROA is fundamental because the 
ability of the management, measured through ROA, can affect the 
chances to join the startup program. Moreover, as dummy 
variables for the exact matching we opt for two dummies linked 
with intangible and R&D expenditure, which assume value 1 if 
the firms report at least 1,000 Euros in intangible assets (or 1,000 
Euros in R&D). These two dummy variables are proxies for the 
                                                             
36 We use the teffects nnmatch STATA 14 command. 
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requirements of Intellectual Property Rights set by the policy.37 
As usual, to be sure that control group is appropriate we verify 
also the quality of balancing; that in our case is very good. 
 
 
Table III.19 Treatment effect using Mahalanobis matching  
Sample raw 
diff. 
ATE ATE b.a. ATET ATET b.a. 
VA -50.799*** 5.465 7.910 14.389*** 14.216***  
(10.931) (6.309) (6.302) (4.068) (4.071) 
VA/wrk -14.049** 1.956 2.839 7.276** 7.186*  
(5.923) (4.668) (4.667) (3.692) (3.689) 
Workers -1.121*** -0.652*** -0.625*** -0.336* -0.339*  
(0.241) (0.136) (0.136) (0.188) (0.188) 
ln(VA) -0.356*** 0.176*** 0.219*** 0.172*** 0.168***  
(0.126) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.048) 
ln(VA/wrk) -0.081 0.266*** 0.301*** 0.251*** 0.248***  
(0.107) (0.050) (0.050) (0.065) (0.065) 
ln(Workers) -0.275*** -0.091** -0.082* -0.079* -0.080*  
(0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) 
Obs. Treated  259 Control 20,106  
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
In this analysis we consider the estimated average treatment 
effect (ATE) and the estimate of the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATET). Results in Table III.19 confirms that the policy 
has a significant impact on value-added and the labor 
productivity, even when the natural logarithms are considered.  
                                                             
37 Unfortunately, we do not have data (or proxies) for the minimum 
ratios of Ph.D degree holders in the workforce (i.e. another potential 
critarion for innovative startup). 
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Even though the impact on value-added creation is much smaller 
than in our previous estimate (see Table III.15), our computation 
confirms that the Startup Act policy positively contributes to 
increase value-added and productivity. Conversely, this time 
when we consider the ATET, we find that the effect on 
employment is no more positive. In conclusion, we find some 
positive contribution of the policy to GDP growth and 
productivity whereas the effect on job creation must be further 
investigate in future work when better data will be available. 
 
5 Conclusions and final 
remarks 
In our analysis, the effect of Italian Startup Act (Law 221/2012) is 
positive on multiple dimensions by easing firm access to fresh 
risk capital and bank debt. Specifically, tax benefits for new 
equity investors alleviate the problem of shortage in equity and 
risk capital, since treatment effect associated to innovative 
startups is positive and statistically significant. Another issue 
tackled by the Startup Act is access to bank loans by small 
enterprises. Small firms meet some problems to get bank loans, 
because they do not have essential collaterals. In this way, the 
development of new firms is hurdled by liquidity problems. 
Following our results, we get that innovative startup have more 
bank loans than never-treated ones38. Namely, innovative 
startups can obtain more capital in both forms: risk capital and 
                                                             
38 About bank debt analysis, in the future, we would like to collect data on which 
innovative startups really received the guaranty, since in this case the state 
guaranty is not automatic as special benefits for capital stock or employment. 
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debts. Thus, they have more resources for developing their 
activities.  In our analysis we investigate whether the Startup Act 
is beneficial to the Italian economy. Overall, we find after the 
treatment period the “former startups” show a higher level of 
total value-added and value-added per employee (i.e. labor 
productivity) than similar untreated firms. These conclusions are 
robust to alternative specifications and robustness checks. 
Conversely, we found that the startup labor regulation, which 
consists of more flexible hiring and firing procedures than 
standard Italian labor law, does not have clear-cut effects on job 
creation. All in all, some simple back-of-envelope computations 
show that the policy positively contributed to firm survival, 
value-added creation and productivity. 
This result is particularly important since positive effects extend 
to the post-treatment phase. For all these reasons, this policy 
shows that a targeted public intervention can spur economic 
growth. Indeed, the Startup Act is similar to government policies, 
which incentive innovation through higher R&D expenses. 
Nowadays, in many countries private R&D is subsidized since 
higher levels of innovation (such as R&D, patents, software, 
skilled workers) means higher level of wellbeing. These kinds of 
public interventions are also justified by the fact that positive 
effects are not limited only to the subsided firms, but the effects 
reach a multitude of stakeholders (government, employees, other 
firms etc.). Moreover, during downturns, policies which focus on 
firm innovation and new entrepreneurship can be seen as a good 
measure to stimulate recovery. As compared to unproductive 
interventions (such as longer unemployment benefits) the Startup 
Act unleashes the growth potential of new firms, thus favoring 
innovation and value-added creation. It is also important to 
underline that a policy is financially sustainable and adopts 
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appropriate actions to reduce moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
So far we have good evidence that the Startup Act benefits for 
GDP exceed implicit and explicit costs. Anyway, more time is 
needed to collect data on long-term effects, since the post-
treatment effect we found may be just a lagged effect of treatment. 
In conclusion, the law 221/2012 seems to reach its main goal in the 
treatment period and to maintain its positive effect on value-
added and productivity even after the treatment period. Our 
results contribute to a better understanding of the impact of 
similar startup policies which have been recently implemented in 
many countries around the world such as Belgium, India, and 
Latvia. As a future investigation, the effects of different startup 
policies should be compared across countries. Also, the long-term 
impact should be further investigated. 
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IV. Appendices 
1 Appendix first chapter 
 
Appendix 1.1 Descriptive statistics and robustness checks 
 
Table IV.1 Sample coverage by industry* 
  Sample - Orbis Population - ISTAT 
Industry NACE rev. 2 
Number of 
firms 
% 
Number of 
firms 
% 
10 - food products 15,871 8.46 55,100 13.20 
11 – beverages 2,202 1.17 2,891 0.69 
13 – textiles 8,324 4.44 15,291 3.66 
14 - wearing apparel 14,100 7.51 32,376 7.76 
15 - leather and related 
products 7,478 3.98 15,692 3.76 
16 - wood products except 
furniture 6,521 3.47 31,720 7.60 
17 - paper and paper products 3,037 1.62 4,054 0.97 
18 - printing and reproduction 
of recorded media 
7,118 3.79 16,289 3.90 
19 - coke and refined petroleum 
products 
301 0.16 320 0.08 
20 - chemicals and chemical 
products 4,415 2.35 4,436 1.06 
21 - pharmaceutical products 451 0.24 464 0.11 
22 - rubber and plastic products 8,183 4.36 10,588 2.54 
To be continued….     
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…Continued… 
    
23 - other non-metallic mineral 
products 
10,872 5.79 21,420 5.13 
24 - basic metals 3,047 1.62 3,811 0.91 
25 - fabricated metal products 38,526 20.53 69,528 16.66 
26 - computer, electronic and 
optical products 
5,443 2.90 5,520 1.32 
27 -  electrical equipment 8,336 4.44 8,971 2.15 
28 - machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 21,953 11.70 23,685 5.68 
29 - motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
2,295 1.22 2,326 0.56 
30 - other transport equipment 2,607 1.39 2,638 0.63 
31 – furniture 9,293 4.95 19,332 4.63 
32 - other manufacturing 7,301 3.89 30,883 7.40 
Total 187,674 100 417,306 100 
*all manufacturing industries, excluding Tobacco (NACE 12) and Repairing of 
machinery and equipment (NACE 33). 
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Table IV.2 Firms and population by region 
Italian region 
Number of firms 
according ISTAT 
Resident population in 
thousands 
Number of 
firms per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Lombardia 83,939 10,019 8.378 
Veneto 47,411 4,906 9.663 
Toscana 40,032 3,742 10.698 
Emilia 
Rom. 
39,599 4,448 8.903 
Campania 28,072 5,839 
 
4.808 
Piemonte 33,289                         4,932 6.750 
Lazio 22,790 5,898 3.864 
Puglia 22,740 4,063 5.600 
Sicilia 22,434 5,056 4.437 
Marche 17,261 1,538 11.223 
Abruzzo 9,653 1,322 7.302 
Friuli-V.G. 8,452 1,219 6.934 
Sardegna 8,218 1,653 4.972 
Umbria 7,023 889 7.900 
Liguria 8,367                         1,565 5.346 
Calabria 8,963 1,965 4.561 
Trentino 
A.A. 
6,420                         1,062 6.045 
Basilicata 3,071                         570 5.388 
Molise 1,861                         310 6.003 
Valle 
Aosta 
725                         126 5.754 
Total 420,320 61,122 6.866 
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Here we report additional regressions. 
Table IV.3 Conditional logit for new firms - the case of multinational 
enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
Province-level productivity 3.733***  2.254*** 1.063*** 0.892** 
  (0.295)  (0.629) (0.379) (0.373) 
(log of) Population  0.993*** 1.096*** 1.296*** 1.120*** 
   (0.058) (0.051) (0.055) (0.074) 
(log of) GDP per capita  3.640*** 1.383*** 2.053*** 1.986*** 
   (0.295) (0.526) (0.378) (0.366) 
(log of) Road    -0.532** -0.405* 
     (0.250) (0.226) 
(log of) Area    0.116 0.083 
     (0.169) (0.149) 
Mountain    -0.017 0.062 
     (0.260) (0.260) 
Island    -0.822** -0.904** 
     (0.374) (0.378) 
Region capital    -0.366*** -0.405*** 
     (0.128) (0.125) 
Agglomeration     0.738* 
      (0.441) 
Market potential     0.035*** 
      (0.004) 
Competition     0.102* 
      (0.053) 
Observations 116,596 116,596 116,596 116,596 116,596 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0874 0.202 0.208 0.214 0.223 
Log likelihood -4788 -4187 -4153 -4126 -4076 
Clustered standard errors (NACE 2-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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As further robustness check, we apply the ACF methodology to 
compute TFP. As shown below our main findings still hold. We start to 
show some statistics on ACF lnTFP by ‘Centro-Nord’ and ‘Mezzogiorno’. 
Table IV.4 ACF lnTFP statistics by 'Centro-Nord' and 'Mezzogiorno' 
 lnTFP for ‘Centro-Nord’ lnTFP for ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
5th percentile 2.688 1.924 
10th percentile 3.066 2.398 
25th percentile 3.553 2.997 
50th percentile 3.995 3.531 
75th percentile 4.519 4.107 
90th percentile 5.167 4.785 
95th percentile 5.671 5.275 
average 4.055 3.553 
standard deviation 0.942 1.053 
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Table IV.5 Conditional logit for entering firms (ACF lnTFP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
            
(log of) Province-level productivity 1.439***  1.055*** 0.897*** 0.907*** 
  (0.169)  (0.255) (0.229) (0.180) 
(log of) Population  0.941*** 0.913*** 1.058*** 0.915*** 
   (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.038) 
(log of) GDP per capita  0.661*** -0.089 -0.119 -0.251 
   (0.211) (0.208) (0.225) (0.174) 
(log of) Road    -0.083 0.010 
     (0.113) (0.115) 
(log of) Area    0.026 0.010 
     (0.054) (0.072) 
Mountain    -0.169 -0.087 
     (0.107) (0.076) 
Island    -0.366*** -0.377*** 
     (0.102) (0.098) 
Region capital    -0.349*** -0.329*** 
     (0.072) (0.059) 
Agglomeration     0.677*** 
      (0.220) 
Market potential     0.026*** 
      (0.005) 
Competition     0.098 
      (0.061) 
Observations 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 5,397,097 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0219 0.0795 0.0844 0.0867 0.0941 
Log likelihood -237542 -223538 -222361 -221801 -220009 
Clustered standard errors (NACE 2-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.6 Probit model for the exit of firms (ACF lnTFP) 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exiting firm (Yes/No)             
              
Firm-level productivity -0.308*** -0.310*** -0.308*** -0.310*** -0.308*** -0.311*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Province-level productivity 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.170** 0.170** 0.170** 0.169** 
  (0.058) (0.059) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) 
Foreign ownership   -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.428*** -0.429*** 
    (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
(log of) Population   -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 
    (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
(log of) GDP per capita   0.034 0.034 0.038 0.038 
    (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.073) 
(log of) Road   -0.070 -0.069 -0.074 -0.072 
    (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
(log of) Area   0.031 0.030 0.033 0.032 
    (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Mountain   -0.137 -0.142 -0.136 -0.141 
    (0.099) (0.098) (0.100) (0.099) 
Island   -0.043 -0.045 -0.042 -0.044 
    (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Region capital   0.049 0.048 0.049 0.049 
    (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Agglomeration     0.027 0.028 
      (0.035) (0.036) 
Market potential     -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Competition     -0.003 -0.002 
      (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -3.481*** -3.104*** -3.072*** -2.694*** -3.171*** -2.788*** 
  (0.265) (0.360) (0.635) (0.734) (0.617) (0.703) 
Observations 510,797 499,660 510,79 499,660 510,797 499,660 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Log likelihood -13129 -13036 -13097 -13004 -13096 -13003 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0915 0.0948 0.0937 0.0971 0.0938 0.0971 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.7 Least squares for ACF lnTFP by ‘Centro-Nord’ and ‘Mezzogiorno’ 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(log of) TFP All firms All firms New entrants New entrants 
          
‘Mezzogiorno’ -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.301*** -0.298*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant 2.442*** 2.404*** 0.864*** 0.898*** 
  (0.079) (0.083) (0.080) (0.171) 
Observations 510,739 510,739 22,207 22,207 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year dummies No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.296 0.301 0.327 0.337 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.8 Least square for ACF lnTFP by Italian macro-regions39 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(log of) TFP All firms All firms New entrants New entrants 
          
North-East -0.033 -0.034 -0.027 -0.025 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) 
Center -0.071 -0.072 -0.091** -0.088** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.035) (0.034) 
South -0.383*** -0.382*** -0.342*** -0.337*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027) 
Islands -0.375*** -0.377*** -0.333*** -0.331*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.050) (0.050) 
Constant 2.480*** 2.442*** 0.918*** 0.953*** 
  (0.089) (0.092) (0.083) (0.174) 
Observations 510,739 510,739 22,207 22,207 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry x Year dummies No Yes No Yes 
 R-squared 0.296 0.302 0.328 0.338 
Clustered standard errors (NUTS 3-digit) in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
  
 
 
 
                                                             
39 ‘Centro-Nord’ is composed by North-West, North-East and Center. 
‘Mezzogiorno’ is composed by Insular and South. 
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Appendix 1.2. Methodology40 
To estimate a firm level production function, and the relative TFP (Total 
Factor Productivity) we exploit firm-level financial accounts. We take 
value-added (Yit) as a proxy for output, fixed assets (Kit) as the proxy for 
capital, and the number of workers (Lit) as the proxy for labor. 
We consider a production function à la Cobb Douglas (the lower-case 
letters indicate the natural logarithm of the variables): 
 
Equation IV.1 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕 +𝝎𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
As a consequence, productivity of firm i at time t, ωit, combines with the 
error part εit, due to a simultaneity bias because of the unobserved (to 
the econometrician) correlation between productivity shocks and 
changes in the combination of factors of production, see Van Beveren 
(2012).  
We use the estimator proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003), which 
solves the simultaneity bias adopting a two-stage procedure between 
inputs and unobservable productivity shocks. Indeed, considering the 
correlation between factors of production and productivity shocks is 
essential, otherwise results may be inconsistent.  The estimator by 
Levinsohn & Petrin can be seen as an evolution of Olley & Pakes' 
estimator proposed in 1996. In Olley & Pakes (1996), the authors use the 
amount of investments as a proxy for the correlation between final 
inputs and unobserved productivity shocks. In that approach, some 
problems arise when firms do not report investments or investments are 
zero. Levinsohn & Petrin’s estimator solve this aspect taking into 
account intermediate inputs such as: materials, energy, electricity, fuels, 
                                                             
40  We follow Petrin et al. (2004) 
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etc. 
Moreover, the estimator by Levinsohn & Petrin makes three main 
assumptions, see Petrin et al. (2004):  
(i) the intermediate input, in our case proxied with materials (Mt), 
depends on capital-transmitted productivity and capital, i.e.: 
 
Equation IV.2 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡) 
 
(ii) the demand function is monotonically increasing in the productivity 
correlated error part, in this way one can write the correlated error part 
in function of intermediate goods and capital: 
 
Equation IV.3 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑡) 
 
 (iii) the productivity behavior can be described by a first-order Markov 
process, namely: 
 
Equation IV.4 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑡−1] + 𝜗𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝜗𝑖𝑡is an innovation to productivity uncorrelated with the capital. 
At this point, the production function can be rewritten as: 
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Equation IV.5 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝝋𝒊𝒕(𝒌𝒊𝒕,𝒎𝒊𝒕) + 𝜷𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
where 𝜑𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡,𝑚𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +𝜔𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑚𝑖𝑡) 
One proceeds with the substitution of 𝜑𝑖𝑡 with a third-order polynomial 
approximation.  Two main stages follow in order to estimate the 
coefficients. Precisely, in the first stage, one estimates 𝛽𝐿 and in the 
second stage one identifies the coefficient 𝛽𝑘 (Petrin et al., 2004). 
 
Appendix 1.3. Data 
Total Factor Productivity is estimated at the firm-level using a Levisohn 
& Petrin (2003) procedure for a Cobb-Douglas production function at 
industry level. Firm-level data on number of employees, fixed assets, 
cost of materials and revenues proxy labor, capital, intermediate inputs 
and output, respectively. Monetary values of revenue and material are 
deflated with yearly industry-specific producer price indices sourced 
from ISTAT, taking as base year 2010.  
Population is the number of inhabitants of an Italian ‘provincia’, which 
corresponds at a NUTS (Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics) 
3-digit level. 
GDP per capita is the NUTS 3-digit level gross development product 
divided by population. 
Road indicates the kilometers of road in a NUTS 3-digit area. 
Area indicates the square kilometers surface of a NUTS 3-digit area. 
Mountain is a binary variable equal to 1 when a NUTS 3-digit province 
is mainly mountainous, i.e. Aosta, Trento and Bolzano. 
Island is a binary variable equal to 1 if a NUTS 3-digit province is mainly 
insular: Olbia-Tempo, Sassari, Nuoro, Oristano, Ogliastra, Medio 
Campidano, Carbona-Iglesias, Cagliari, Trapani, Palermo, Messina, 
Catania, Enna, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Siracusa, Ragusa. 
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Region capital is a binary variable equal to 1 when the NUTS 3-digit 
hosts also the capital of the region, namely: Roma, Milano, Napoli, 
Torino, Palermo, Genova, Bologna, Firenze, Bari, Venezia, Trieste, 
Perugia, Cagliari, Trento, Ancona, Catanzaro, L'Aquila, Potenza, 
Campobasso, Aosta. 
Agglomeration is a firm-level binary variable equal to 1 when the firm 
is active in the NACE 2-digit industry that is prevalent in the NUTS 3-
digit province. 
Market potential is proxied by the total amount of revenues sold by all 
the firms in the NUTS 3-digit province, active in the NACE 2-digit 
industry to which the firm belongs. 
Competition is the number of firms in the NUTS 3-digit province, active 
in the NACE 2-digit industry to which a firm belongs. 
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2 Appendix second chapter 
 
Appendix 2.1. Moran tests 
In this appendix, we report Moran tests for all the contiguity matrices in 
the second chapter: 
Table IV.9 Moran test for every spatial matrix LevPet lnTFP 
 20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-off 
Linear  
distance 
5.212*** 
(0.000) 
6.574*** 
(0.000) 
7.628*** 
(0.000) 
9.212*** 
(0.000) 
Squared 
distance 
3.716 
(0.000) 
4.173 
(0.000) 
4.668*** 
(0.000) 
4.783*** 
(0.000) 
Interlocking 
directorates 
   7.588*** 
(0.000) 
Moran tests’ value p-values in parentheses *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01 
Table IV.10 Moran test for every spatial matrix ACF lnTFP 
 20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-off 
Linear  
distance 
4.489*** 
(0.000) 
 
4.441*** 
(0.000) 
 
5.005*** 
(0.000) 
 
6.087*** 
(0.000) 
 Squared 
distance 
3.306*** 
(0.000) 
 
3.398*** 
(0.000) 
 
3.663*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
4.489*** 
(0.000) 
 Interlocking 
directorates 
   4.125*** 
(0.000) 
 Moran tests’ value p-values in parentheses *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01 
Table IV.11 AIC values matrix LevPet lnTFP SAR and SAC 
  20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-
off 
Linear  
distance 
SAR 
SAC 
1564.095 
1541.429 
1560.838 
1539.720 
1556.498 
1536.689 
1555.996 
1536.973 
Squared 
distance 
SAR 
SAC 
 
1568.449 
1543.844 
1567.898 
1544.083 
1564.732 
1542.225 
1564.339 
1542.144 
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Table IV.12 AIC values matrix ACF lnTFP SAR and SAC 
  20 Km 50 Km 80 Km No cut-
off 
Linear  
distance 
SAR 
SAC 
1519.434 
1517.080 
 
1521.360 
1518.072 
 
1519.689 
1517.685 
 
1519.369 
1517.968 
Squared 
distance 
SAR 
SAC 
 
1523.299 
1520.448 
 
1523.763 
1520.830 
 
1522.384 
1519.794 
 
1522.095 
1519.624 
 
 
Table IV.13 LM tests SEM/SAR with interlocking directorates’ matrices 
 LS lnTFP LevPet lnTFP ACF 
lnTFP 
LM SEM 23.787*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
35.824*** 
(0.000) 
6.818*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
LM SAR 26.337*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
44.620*** 
(0.000) 
10.568*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
RLM SEM 1.160 
(0.281) 
 
2.484 
(0.115) 
8.346*** 
(0.000) 
 RLM SAR 3.709* 
(0.054) 
11.280*** 
(0.000) 
12.096*** 
(0.000) 
p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
Appendix 2.2. Data 
We shortly describe the variables used in the analysis: 
lnTFPi is the natural logarithm of TFP, which is computed as described 
in Section II.3. This variable is considered a measure of firm 
productivity. 
Innovationi is the of total value (in current thousands of Euros) of 
patents, software, know-how, other Intellectual Property Rights, 
trademarks and brands divided by number of workers of the firm i41. 
This index is expected to be a proxy of total innovation level, not only of 
                                                             
41 To avoid any problem for firms with zero values in innovation, we add a 
notional value of 1 k EUR for any firm. 
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technological innovation as in the case of patents42. Moreover, 
considering simple indicators (such as the number of patents) may be 
unfair, since their values cover a large range, as stated in Gambardella 
et al. (2008). 
Internationali is a dummy variable, which assumes value 1 if the 
ownership of firm i is not Italian. We expect that multinational firms 
usually have a higher lnTFP than domestic ones, because they may own 
a better organization. Indeed, only more productive firms usually tend 
to open new branches abroad. 
Table IV.14 Average values of innovation and productivity by firm type 
Firms characteristics Number of firms Innovation lnTFP 
Small 338 0.645 11.219 
Medium 378 0.735 11.283 
Large 85 0.946 11.428 
International 
ownership 
195 0.675 11.447 
Domestic ownership 606 0.734 11.215 
All 801 0.720 11.271 
Table IV.14 shows that larger firms tend to have higher values for 
innovation than SMEs. This evidence means that innovation propensity 
usually increases by firm size.  
 
 
 
                                                             
42 Since the innovation concept could be quite wide (it may mean a strictly 
technological innovation or an innovation in design, marketing, etc.), we need 
to explain what we are considering as innovation within firm business and how 
we quantify it. Our choice falls on total value of know-how, trademark and 
industrial property; in this way, we can catch various forms of innovation 
(which do not only have a technological dimension).  
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Appendix 2.3. Further results considering specific sector 
 
Table IV.15 Least-squares regressions 
 LS lnTFP LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 4.953*** 
(1.821) 
16.836*** 
(2.190) 
 
13.369*** 
(2.108) 
 International 0.208*** 
(0.043) 
0.283*** 
(0.052) 
-0.013 
(0.050) 
Pharma 0.070 
(0.054) 
0.218*** 
(0.065) 
-0.107* 
(0.063) 
Electronics -0.286*** 
(0.041) 
-0.312*** 
(0.049) 
-0.440*** 
(0.047) 
Intercept 11.270*** 
(0.003) 
5.737*** 
(0.036) 
4.612*** 
(0.035) 
 
 
R2 
Adjusted-R2 
0.119 
0.115 
0.199 
0.195 
 
0.153 
0.149 
Observations 801 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10*  
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Table IV.16 SAR with interlocking directorates 
 LS lnTFP LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 4.331** 
(1.789) 
15.614*** 
(2.138) 
0.278  
12.750*** 
(2.094) 
-0.0126 
(9 
International 0.203*** 
(0.042) 
0.067 
(0.0539 
0.278*** 
(0.050) 
0.208 
 
- .  
(0.049) 
-0.096 
 
 
Pharma 0.067 
(0.053) 
0.208*** 
(0.064) 
-0.096 
(0.062) 
Electronics -0.270 
(0.040) 
-0.292*** 
(0.048) 
-0.430*** 
(0.047) 
Intercept 8.374*** 
(0.678) 
4.076*** 
(0.332) 
 
 
3.953*** 
(0.295) 
Rho 0.256*** 
(0.060) 
0.282 
(0.056) 
-736.349 
0.144** 
(0.064) 
 
 
Loglikelihood 
AIC 
-593.177 
1200.4 
-736.349 
1486.7 
 
-716.269 
1446.5 
Observations 801 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table IV.17 Impacts of SAR model LS lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 4.372** 
(1.805) 
1.485* 
(0.775) 
5.856** 
(2.466) 
International 0.205*** 
(0.043) 
() 
0.070*** 
(0.026) 
0.275*** 
(0.060) 
Pharma 0.680 
(0.054) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
0.091 
(0.074) 
 
 
Electronics -0.273*** 
(0.040) 
-0.093*** 
(0.034) 
-0.366*** 
(0.063) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.18 Impacts of SAR  model LevPet lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 15.790*** 
(2.162) 
6.064*** 
(1.853) 
21.860*** 
(3.423) 
International 0.281*** 
(0.051) 
 
0.108*** 
(0.036) 
0.389*** 
(0.077) 
Pharma 0.210*** 
(0.065) 
0.080** 
(0.032) 
0.291*** 
(0.090) 
- 
 
Electronics -0.295*** 
(0.048) 
-0.113*** 
(0.035) 
-0.409*** 
(0.073) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10*  
 
 
 
Table IV.19 Impacts of SAR  model ACF lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 12.791*** 
(2.100) 
2.184* 
(1.184) 
14.976*** 
(2.679) 
International -0.013 
(0.049) 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.058) 
Pharma -0.096 
(0.062) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.113 
(0.074) 
- 
 
Electronics -0.431*** 
(0.047) 
-0.074** 
(0.038) 
-0.505*** 
(0.064) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.20 Regressions results SAC with for interlocking directorates 
network in  W1 and geographical distance in W2 
 LS lnTFP LevPet lnTFP ACF lnTFP 
Innovation 4.309** 
(1.789) 
15.138*** 
(2.136) 
00.308 
12.577*** 
(0.021) 
International 0.201*** 
(0.042) 
0.271*** 
(0.050) 
-0.015*** 
(0.021) 
Pharma 0.069 
(0.054) 
 
 
0.204*** 
(0.064) 
-0.092 
(0.063) 
Electronics -0.264*** 
(0.040) 
 
 
-0.280*** 
(0.048) 
-0.421 
(0.047) 
Intercept 8.427*** 
(0.683) 
4.165*** 
(0.339) 
4.002*** 
(0.298) 
Rho 0.251*** 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
( 
 
0.265*** 
(0.058) 
0.132** 
(0.065) 
388 Lambda 0.145 
(0.150) 
0.282** 
(0.139) 
0.163 
(0.149) 
Loglikelihood 
AIC 
-592.708 
1201.4 
-734.275 
1484.6 
2,205 
-715.720 
1447.4 
Observations 801 801 801 
Standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-values < *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01 
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Table IV.21 Impacts of SAC  model LS lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 4.457** 
(1.840) 
1.525** 
(0.076) 
5.982** 
(2.505) 
International 0.200*** 
(0.039) 
()0.071 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
0.269*** 
(0.058) 
Pharma 0.071 
(0.052) 
0.024 
(0.020) 
0.095 
(0.071) 
-0.358 
 
Electronics -0.267*** 
(0.039) 
-0.091*** 
(0.028) 
-0.358*** 
(0.058) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table IV.22 Impacts of SAC  model LevPet lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 15.370*** 
(2.453) 
5.590*** 
(1.824) 
20.960*** 
(3.650) 
International 0.273*** 
(0.047) 
 
0.098*** 
(0.028) 
0.370*** 
(0.063) 
Pharma 0.197*** 
(0.06) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
0.268*** 
(0.084) 
--0.394 
 
Electronics -0.290*** 
(0.046) 
-0.104*** 
(0.03) 
-0.394*** 
 (0.062) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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Table IV.23 Impacts of SAC  model ACF lnTFP 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Innovation 12.740*** 
(0.018) 
1.814** 
(0.941) 
14.554*** 
(2.178) 
International -0.015 
(0.056) 
-0.094 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.017 
(0.063) 
Pharma -0.094 
(0.061) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.108 
(0.070) 
 
 
Electronics -0.418*** 
(0.042) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
-0.479*** 
(0.061) 
Simulated standard errors in parentheses based on 1000 replications; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
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3 Appendix third chapter 
Appendix 3.1. Survival Analysis 
Table IV.24 Startup survival 
VARIABLES s_var 
    
Tr_mise -0.053 
 (0.067) 
Intangible_dummy 0.327*** 
 (0.008) 
Constant 2.191*** 
 (0.035) 
Regional dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
Observations 726,204 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10* 
 
Table IV.25 Small firm survival 
VARIABLES s_var 
    
Tr_mise -0.049 
 (0.067) 
Intangible_dummy 0.295*** 
 (0.005) 
Age -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Age2 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Constant 2.150*** 
 (0.019) 
Observations 2,077,330 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-value < 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.10*   
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Appendix 3.2. Distribution of untreated firms versus treated 
ones 
 
Table IV.26 Distribution of untreated versus treated firms 
Variable Untreated Treated  
 Mean SD Mean SD P-value 
Center-North 0.7030 0.4569 0.7905 0.0102 0.000 
Innovative industries 0.1579 0.3647 0.7797 0.4145 0.000 
The t-test refers to the null hypothesis that two populations have the same mean 
The geographical and sectoral distribution differ between treated and 
untreated firms 
 
Appendix 3.3. description of the variables 
 
Stk cap:  total amounf of stock capital in ‘000 Euros. 
Bank: total amount of bank debts in ‘000 Euros. 
Workers: number of employees. 
lnstkcapital:  natural logarithm of the variable stock capital 
lnbank:  natural logarithm of the variable bank. 
lnworkers: natural logarithm of the variable workers. 
Start: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is at most 5 years old and shows 
at most 5 m EUR in revenues; otherwise, it is 0. 
Intangible_dummy: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm has at least 1,000 
Euros of intangible assets; otherwise, it is 0. 
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Treatment: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MISE’ as an ‘innovative startup’; otherwise, it is 0. 
Post-treatment: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm used to be listed in the 
special register by ‘MiSE’ as an ‘innovative startup’; otherwise, it is 0. 
Treatment2013: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MISE’ as an ‘innovative startup ’ in 2013; otherwise, it is 0. 
Treatment2014: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MiSE’ as an ‘innovative startup ’ in 2014; otherwise, it is 0. 
Treatment2015: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MiSE’ as an ‘innovative startup ’ in 2015; otherwise, it is 0. 
Treatmentnorth: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MiSE’ and is located in Center or Norhtern Italy; otherwise, 
it is 0. 
Treatmentsouth: binary variable. It t is 1 if the firm is listed in the special 
register by ‘MiSE’ and is located in Southern Italy; otherwise, it is 0. 
Mills: value of Mills’ ratio. 
VA: value-added in ‘000 Euros. 
ln(VA): natural logarithm of the variable value-added. 
VA/wrk: value-added in ‘000 Euros divided by number of workers. 
ln(VA/wrk): natural logarithm of the variable value-added per worker. 
ever_mise: binary variable. It is 1 if the firm is or used to be listed in the 
special register by ‘MISE’ as an ‘innovative startup’; otherwise, it is 0. 
Age: the age of the firm in years, namely the difference between the 
observation year and the year of foundation.  
Age2: it is the squared value of age. 
Year dummy: binary variable, which changes among the years. 
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